The next phase of counter-militancy

With the first phase of the military offensive to clear militants from South Waziristan now nearing completion, the counter-militancy campaign is expected to transition into the next, more critical phase. This will entail steps to ensure that the gains that have been made are sustainable. It will also mean wrestling with the challenges that have emerged from a remarkably expeditious operation.

Among the most pressing challenges is to stem the wave of violent reprisals that has struck the country and turned Peshawar into a battle zone. Daily bombings, which have already disrupted people’s lives, can strain the public consensus against militancy and shake the public’s resolve to fight it.

Pursuing the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) leaders and fighters who seem to have dispersed into neighbouring Agencies means that the military campaign has now expanded to parts of Orakzai. As militants are using the access into Khyber to unleash a region of terror on Peshawar, “siege” operations are also planned here to restrict and neutralise the movement of militants. Two more Agencies are therefore expected in the next phase to see selective and targeted actions.

What will also be critical in the months ahead are post-conflict efforts that insure that the area can be held and an environment inhospitable to the return of militants is established. Although the military presence will be retained, over time a gradual de-induction of forces will depend on the Frontier Corps being able to assume security responsibilities along with the revival of the traditional political agent-tribal compact.

These will eventually be the exit tickets for the army. The sooner the civil administration can be reconstituted with local support, the easier it will be to start pulling out regular forces. This will be vital to avoid the troops becoming mired in a war of attrition or an unceasing fire-fight.

The South Waziristan operation has proceeded more speedily and with fewer casualties than was anticipated. Security forces secured much of the area within a month of launching the action. The militants have been driven out of their bases, their training centres dismantled and their sanctuaries eliminated.

Two of Operation Rah-e-Nijat’s three core objectives have almost been achieved: re-establishing the state’s writ in a longstanding no-go area and dismantling the command-and-control infrastructure of the TTP. The third objective of creating space for the political authorities in partnership with the local tribes to establish durable control remains an imposing task for the future.

Two elements of the military and political strategy have especially helped in attaining the stated objectives. The first is the “ridgeline approach” that was followed. This meant advancing troops avoided the main roads and instead focused on dominating the heights to secure the valleys – a tactic that caught the militants by surprise. This was buttressed by the reconfiguration of C-130 aircraft with surveillance eye-in-the sky capabilities to ensure accurate intelligence.

The second key factor was that the North Waziristan chapter of the TTP kept away from the battle in the south. Throughout the duration of the offensive in South Waziristan, there was not a single incident of hostility in the North. If that had happened it would have greatly complicated and distracted from the effort in the South.

As in Swat, another two key factors, proved to be decisive: unstinting public and media support for the military action as well as the evacuation of local residents from the area (300,000 inhabitants fled the battle area), which in turn allowed a sustained air and artillery campaign to be undertaken.

The toughest resistance was encountered around and in Kotkai on the eastern axis (leading up to Sararogha) in the three-pronged operation. This was the base from where the militants trained and launched suicide bombers. Sararogha served as the nerve centre of the TTP and their foreign allies.

Meanwhile, the bulk of training centres were discovered and destroyed in Kamigarum on the western axis. The multi-directional strategy helped to destroy the infrastructure of terrorism across a vast swathe of territory and also to establish control in a relatively short period.

The onset of winter, when traditionally two-thirds of the inhabitants of the Mehsud area seasonally migrate to escape the harsh weather and seek employment in the adjoining settled areas of the NWFP, will be a factor that will likely facilitate the campaign to clear the remaining pockets of resistance.

The skeptical view that the operation has made modest progress as it has only scattered the Taliban overlooks and minimises the fact that the militants are on the run, their capabilities have been degraded and their bases and freedom of movement sharply restricted. Their main training, command and communication centres have been neutralised. This means that while the militants are in hiding their effectiveness has been substantially reduced.

TTP spokesmen have declared that their fighters have avoided engaging the army to begin a guerrilla campaign later. This claim is contradicted by the fact that the heavy weapons and large amounts of ammunition that have been left behind suggest a scramble, not a planned retreat.

Plans already in play to assault the militants’ logistics routes in Khyber Agency and mount military pressure in the region around the Tirah valley, lower Kurram and Orakzai are aimed at tightening the noose around the Taliban believed to be hiding there.

As this campaign proceeds, it is imperative that the military efforts are swiftly followed by a political drive to tackle the aftermath of the operation. This means dealing effectively with the administrative, reconstruction and development aspects of the post-conflict challenges.

In this regard the experience in Swat has been less than edifying. While the clear-and-hold phases have proceeded as smoothly as could be expected, the build-and-sustain efforts have been slow, faltering and thus far incoherent.

Even as the international community has expressed a commitment to come forth with assistance in this regard, the government has yet to even complete its “damage needs assessment” report that can serve as a credible plan to elicit support from donors. This means that the completion of the “post-conflict needs assessment” (dealing with governance issues) will be further delayed.

These delays do not inspire confidence at home and abroad about the official ability to deal with the immediate post operation challenges much less in addressing the longer-term governance architecture without which the stabilisation of the area cannot be placed on a sustainable basis.

If addressing post-conflict issues in Swat are proving so challenging for the civilian authorities, stabilising South Waziristan, once the military operation ends, will be infinitely harder. Rebuilding where extensive damage has occurred, as well as enabling the safe repatriation and rehabilitation of displaced people, will be among the urgent tasks.

The battle has therefore to be fought on many fronts, and it is the government that must step up and take responsibility to establish the structures for governance and the means to deliver services to the inhabitants of these areas if conditions are to be created to prevent the return of militancy. Military action, after all, is only one prong in an optimal policy response.

Looking ahead, the two key factors that will help determine the longer-term sustainability of the military gains in South Waziristan are unrelenting and vigorous efforts to mobilise public support for the anti-militancy effort and putting in place the governance structures that are seen as legitimate as well as responsive to the needs of the people living there.

Driving the TTP out

For all their brave talk of fighting, dying and teaching the army a lesson, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in South Waziristan did what they always do when confronted by a larger force: they fled. A number, of course, stayed back, possibly as a rearguard to slow the army’s advance. That would make sense, as from their well-positioned locations they could extract a heavy toll from the army. As it happened, the death toll was relatively light. In all, 550 insurgents, less than five per cent of the estimated numbers of the TTP force, were killed at the cost to the army of 100 brave soldiers and officers.

The TTP in South Waziristan had behaved much in the same way as in Swat. In fact, they acted as insurgents do all over the world when confronted by a regular army, which is to avoid set-piece battles so that they may live to fight another day. That is not to say that the operation was not a success. In fact, a great deal was achieved by the operation, and at a far lower cost in lives than expected.

By driving the TTP out of their strongholds in South Waziristan the army deprived them of the use of a safe haven, training facilities, bomb-making laboratories, etc. They also forced the retreating TTP to abandon a sizeable amount of weaponry and explosives, all of which will have to be replenished at considerable cost and much travail.

Insurgencies are wars of attrition and also a test of stamina and morale. The loss of strategic territory and weaponry weakens the insurgents, lowers morale and correspondingly inflates the will, effectiveness and resolve of the army and the nation. While the army has emerged the victor in South Waziristan, to maintain its ascendancy it will have to pursue and engage the enemy wherever they retreat. The TTP must know that if they are not going anywhere, nor is the army; and that, until such time as they relent, surrender or are defeated, neither will the army.

What bodes well for the future is the acceptance by the public of the legitimacy of operation Rah-e-Nijat. Public “acceptance” and “legitimacy” are key elements in determining the eventual success or failure of anti-insurgency strategies, just as they were in the dozen or so similar operations elsewhere in the world. William Polk’s study of insurgencies further reveals that no matter how much alien occupiers wish to improve the condition of the local populace, when pitted against native insurgents the sympathy of the local population will invariably be with the latter. It is mostly for this reason that America cannot win in Afghanistan and why we can, even though we may not.

Of course, these are as yet early days of the civil war that is fast enveloping Pakistan. The TTP leadership is alive and yelling revenge. They have responded with a spate of bombings in Peshawar; although when they realised that the public reaction was hostile their spokesman chose to blame the bombings on the Americans.

Public anger against the Taliban is often accompanied by ire against the authorities for failing to protect the population. And because it is always difficult to acknowledge our own failings the public places the blame on foreign conspiracies. Actually, the public seem not as much lost as bewildered. They have no idea what to believe, let alone who. They cannot comprehend what is happening to their world and resent the fact that they cannot mend it.

Unless, therefore, the suicide bombings are thwarted more effectively, current support for the government will dissipate, giving way not only to anger but worse: hopelessness and a feeling that the government is helpless. And it is precisely when the public’s pity at their own fate turns to contempt for the government that the insurgents step forward and offer themselves as alternative rulers, promising peace and an end to the slaughter, in return for the loyalty of the populace.

We saw this earlier in Swat when the police ran away, local officials were killed and the TTP stepped in to take on the job of maintaining law and order and dispensing justice. We also witnessed the absurd spectacle of TV channels broadcasting the speech of Sufi Mohammed proclaiming a new order that ironically would have made TV channels and Parliament redundant.

Although it was sobering to be confronted with what the future would look like if the TTP prevailed, more troubling was the fact that the whole nation viewed the spectacle being enacted in Swat so passively. Not a single man took to the streets against the brutalities of the TTP. And Parliament actually called for negotiations with the TTP, undoubtedly out of a sense of fear and foreboding, rather than patience and wisdom. Sadly, terror and force, the means that wins the easiest victory over reason, was being allowed to prevail.

The feeble and flaccid public response to the happenings in Swat was a revelation. It gave the enemy hope and showed how close we, as a society, are to the abyss. And were it not for the media’s incessant screening of the young woman squealing while being whipped, would anyone have bothered or the army worked up the resolve to act? It is said that the army can only act with the support of the people. One discerned no such support among the people of Dacca in 1971. Luckily for the Jews, Moses did not conduct a poll before he set off. The fact is that when great changes occur in a nation’s history, when great principles are involved, the majority are often wrong. Remedies often lie not in the ceaseless deliberations of many but the actions of a few.

As a result of the current vacuum in leadership, the clear direction which the nation so sorely requires is missing. The sarkar is rudderless. Mr Zardari feels wronged because people are laying the blame for the confusion that prevails at his doorstep. Yes, they are, but only because he not only errs, he blunders. Mr Zardari has responded by accusing people of jumping the gun and writing his political obituary. Actually, not only are they jumping the gun, they have hurdled the cannon; and what is being written now is not his political obituary but an epitaph which normally follows, and not precedes, an obituary. In other words, they are writing what they sense he has become—history. What, then, does the future hold? Who knows? Except, that it does seem dark and, at times, irretrievably so.

But if Mr Zardari, though more so his American mentors, display a mite of common sense and read the writing on the wall and depart—in the case of Mr Zardari, from office, and in the case of the Americans from Afghanistan—perhaps the darkness we are in will not stretch beyond the first light of day. Were the Americans to depart from Afghanistan the song that Al Qaeda, the Lashkars and the TTP sing will have little resonance. The Al Qaeda variety, in particular the Arab lot, who have had a hand in the murder of as many as 800 tribal maliks of FATA, can expect a cruel end when the tide turns, as it will. The Laskars, Jaishes and the TTP are more the concern of the establishment. They created them and now should snuff them out.

All this could happen, given time and proper leadership in Pakistan; and less paranoia and more imagination on the part of America. It is a shame, therefore, that the government is urging the Americans not to leave Afghanistan. How can those who, when they came should never have stayed on, be urged to continue a while longer? And after eight years, is Pakistan still not ready to cope on its own with the challenges it faces? Why should our leaders who act as if they are not afraid of God be scared of the adversary? Told that all Europe had fallen to the Nazis and asked how England expected to defend itself, an English cartoonist replied, “Very well, then alone.” Are we up to it?

A tale of two fronts

THE terrorist attack on Mumbai created a two-fold crisis for Pakistan. It provoked India into belligerency and also increased Pakistan’s difficulties in dealing with the terrorist challenge in its northern part. The situation on both fronts is grim.

Professional warmongers were able to turn the Indian people’s shock at the nature and scale of the raid on Mumbai into unprecedented hostility towards Pakistan. Their call to arms has so far gone unheeded and they have lost the first round to peace activists who also have appeared on both sides in greater strength than ever.

However, the jingoists are unwilling to quit the ring. On both sides arguments are being cobbled together to keep the fires of conflict raging. Their immediate target is to prevent a resumption of the composite dialogue on which hopes of a durable and fruitful peace in South Asia had come to rest. These arguments cannot be put out of the way by routine appeals to one another’s good sense; they can only be overcome through a well-considered strategy to fight the scourge of terrorism.

A large number of people in both India and Pakistan will concede that the principles of good neighbourliness and common interests demand that the two states should always be able to talk to each other without any reservations. Yet they find it extremely hard to resume their dialogue and this at a time when the only alternative to negotiations is apocalyptic disaster.

The dominant Indian opinion, as far as one could gather from brief exchanges with a cross-section of Delhi civil society, rules out official-level talks with Pakistan on the basis of its interpretation of the Mumbai carnage, its reservations about the change of regime in Pakistan, its expectations of US success in twisting Pakistan’s arm, and its lack of faith in civil society (particularly of Pakistan) initiatives.

These assumptions can be better addressed in the reverse order.

The Indian elite’s loss of faith in civil society’s capacity to catalyse a positive change shows it has not taken account of the fact that the peace constituency in both India and Pakistan has become much larger than ever. The size and spontaneity of anti-war demonstrations held after Nov 26 were not witnessed during previous confrontations.

The signs of despair in warmongers’ ranks, as evident in their moving further and further away from reason, confirm civil society’s accession to strength. Its progress cannot be as quick and dramatic as the state’s adventures simply because it lacks the latter’s capacity to legitimise any abuse of authority. In any case, one is astounded to see civil society denigrated in our subcontinent, home to one of the world’s most outstanding civil society movements — better known as the unarmed people’s struggle for freedom from the greatest imperialist power in history.

Some of the hawks who make a living by confounding their audience with their arbitrary analyses argue that India should not talk to Pakistan because that will undermine US efforts to force the latter to behave. This reflects a degree of confidence in the effectiveness of the US anti-terror strategy no independent observer is prepared to endorse. At the moment the US policy is raising more terrorists in Pakistan’s tribal belt than Nato forces can kill. Any increase in the terrorists’ threat to Pakistan’s stability cannot be in India’s interest. Fortunately, saner elements in Delhi are conscious of this and are therefore wary of firing at Pakistan over American shoulders.

The Indian observers’ poor opinion of Pakistan’s latest experiment in democratic governance comes out when they are asked to consider the possibility that the perpetrators of the Mumbai outrage wanted to rock the Zardari-led government. Quite a few of them have not been able to get over the end of their romance with Gen Musharraf. Many Pakistanis will agree with their Indian friends that the present dispensation is a pale version of a representative government. However, what the Indian critics choose to ignore is the fact that their jingoist rhetoric is tilting the balance against Pakistan’s civilian authority.

The strongest Indian argument against talking formally to Pakistan is that while they do not wish to hold the Pakistan government directly responsible for the Mumbai affair the level of organisation and expertise evident in the operation could not have been possible without the backing or complicity of some privileged groups. Besides, according to them, their claim that the raiders belonged to Pakistan has not been effectively rebutted. Thus, Nov 26 was to India what 9/11 was to the US and the sequential developments could not be any different.

It is possible to question this line of argument, particularly the attempt to legitimise the US invasion of Afghanistan. One may only look at the havoc wrought by the Bush team of hawks. They have certainly punished the Afghan people with a vengeance, the innocent Afghans more than the Taliban, but they have also made the quasi-religious militants almost invincible. No US expert, civilian or military, entertains hopes of victory in Afghanistan and attempts have already been made to find a way to share power with the Taliban. Did India want this scenario re-enacted on a broader scale? One may believe the Indians when they reply in the negative.

That leaves the question of Pakistan’s meeting Indian demands for “costs” for Mumbai and the surrender of suspects which are said to be essential for defusing the situation.As has been argued by many people, for Islamabad the threat from terrorists is far more serious than India’s ultimatums. Pakistan’s very survival in its present form depends on eliminating the terrorists’ challenge. The Indian pressure for its satisfaction only adds to the urgency of this task. It is obvious that a series of steps will have to be taken to ensure peace along the country’s southern border.

To begin with, more teeth need to be put into the hitherto tepid crackdown on organisations known for fomenting militancy. The trial of leaders of cross-border forays should begin expeditiously. Pakistan’s bona fides will be strengthened if these trials are fair and transparent. The possibility of inviting jurists from the region is worth exploring. These measures should help Pakistan regain the international community’s vitally needed confidence and support. It may not be necessary for the prime minister to think of a new law to punish Pakistanis for serious crimes abroad. Section 125 of the Penal Code already provides for life imprisonment for anyone who “wages war against the government of any Asiatic power in alliance or at peace with Pakistan or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war.”

Unfortunately, however, the Indian demands have given some political groups in Pakistan one more reason to oppose government moves against the militants. Islamabad is being accused of cowardly yielding to pressure from across the border. They don’t see the militants doing anything wrong in Fata or Swat or anywhere else. Among other things, this means that the southern frontier cannot be secured in peace without achieving peace along the northern border.

There the problem is not only the drone raids but the whole US-Nato strategy. So long as this strategy is followed Pakistan will not be out of the danger zone. Thus, instead of quarrelling over a single act of terrorism, Pakistan and India should join hands and seek other regional collaborators’ help in bringing the US and Nato operations under regional or UN control to settle Afghanistan’s future.

Protesting hypocrites

The moribund civil society has sprung into action, expressing clamorous solidarity with the people of Palestine.

The modest turnouts at the demonstrations is a reflection of the penetration of the electronic medium – the organisers relied on Facebook, mass e-mailing and sms messages to gather support.

Human rights activists, political party and trade union leaders, lawyers, doctors, journalists, show-business personalities, students and teachers of both genders and all age groups are out carrying Palestinian flags and banners.

Of late, Pakistanis have shown a tremendous spirit for exhibiting a global conscience, and exposing double standards which is the flipside of international diplomacy. However, it is in the denial of their own glaring double-standards that they manifest a hitherto unknown spirit. A catastrophe of unprecedented magnitude is unfolding in Gaza, but the atrocities being perpetuated in Pakistan’s north-west, particularly in Swat, don’t seem to prick the conscience of our concerned gentry.

Swat appears to have been consciously expunged from their memory. It figures in op-ed pieces, but has vanished completely from their drawing-room discourse, barring a digression on those rare occasions when wall graffiti threatening Talibanisation are spotted. Swat does not even have a functioning online petition on the famous website of the same name.

I leave to the more learned the utility of protesting against Israeli, but why do these protestors remain unperturbed by the atrocities committed in our own backyard? While Kashmir was up in arms and street protests routine, there was merely a sound from these self-proclaimed practitioners of universal rights.

They protest because protests are going on the world over. It fits into their philosophy of jumping on the bandwagon of popular dissent.

Another case in point, which highlights the hypocrisy of our civil society, was the readiness of students of the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), Pakistan’s premier humanities university, to join the protesting lawyers. However, Swat and the scenic Malam Jabba valley, visited twice annually by LUMS students, did not elicit a word of protest from them. Despite having a much stronger link with the north-west, visited in hordes by these students, all ties were forgotten once it was in the clutches of obscurantism.

No groups – from among students or the civil society – have stepped forward with ideas or policies that would in some way ameliorate the plight of the nearly one-third of the 1.5 million of Swat who are now homeless. No suggestions have been made for setting up of refugee camps and girls’ schools, nearly 200 of which have been forced to close down.

Let alone present any creative or practical solution for the miserable residents of Swat, our civil society cannot even streamline its effort – even when it would further its own cause.

Separated by a couple of days from the protest against Israel of the self-proclaimed silent and intellectually endowed civil society was another protest. Students associated with the Jamaat-e-Islami also expressed solidarity with Palestinians. While reluctance on the part of the two groups to synergise their efforts is understandable, the similarity in the two groups’ protests shows that that difference in civil society groups is pretence.

The intensity of anger, the sloganeering, the haphazard nature of the procession, the clubbing together of Israel and the United States, blaming it all on a Zionist agenda, leaves one with a feeling of déjà vu. The burning of the Israeli flag proved beyond doubt that no matter how different the social, economic and educational backgrounds, when it comes to venting anger against their favourite punching bag, we are all the same.

Contextualising this behaviour in a literary context, Big Brother of Orwellian fame appears to be watching; pulling the strings of earthly minions – civil society included. However, there is another similarly sombre view of the totalitarian nature of modern reality espoused by Aldous Huxley in Brave New World. While Orwell feared that modes of information and knowledge will be controlled and stifled, leaving the masses in ignorance, Huxley predicted that there will be such a glut of information that people will fail to discern the relevant from the frivolous; that the level of mass information will reach such a level that the real issues will be buried in the mass of trivialities.

Protests against Israeli aggression escalate across Pakistan, while Swat, the north-west, Balochistan, Kashmir and other issues that plague our society lie forgotten or are placed on the back-burner. Huxley stands vindicated. The age of mass information lays bare the superficial expression of concern of the civil gentry, if not their hypocrisy.