Who’ll bell the cat?

Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif hit the nail on the head when he observed the other day that the drone strikes into Pakistan’s territory constituted a most serious menace to the country’s sovereignty, and therefore the federal government must put a stop to them. The million-dollar question, however, is who’ll bell the cat, and how?

Mr Sharif’s own prescription is that the predatory raids can be brought to a halt if those in the saddle in Islamabad take a firm stance against them, instead of coming up with hollow condemnatory statements, and shun American aid altogether. But that’s easier said than done. Isn’t it?

In its April 16 issue, this newspaper quoted a comment carried by The Wall Street Journal that the present Pakistani government has allowed the Americans to raise the number of drone strikes while at the same time condemning them publicly. A similar disclosure was made by Wikileaks.

The spin doctors of the government conveniently brush aside such charges as part of an attempt to give a bad name, at home and abroad, to the democratically elected leadership. In all fairness, one can’t rule out that the foreign media are cooking up stories of our government having acceded to the predatory attacks. That said, two facts are indisputable: one, there’s no letup in the drone attacks; two, in the wake of every strike the government protests with the US authorities and seeks assurance that there wouldn’t be another such incident. What else can one make of it? If our leadership hasn’t consented to the drone attacks, why doesn’t it tell its American counterparts in so many words that enough is enough and, come what may, it wouldn’t countenance them?

Washington has also been requested to transfer drone technology to Islamabad. But given the trust deficit that characterises the bilateral relations, particularly the suspicion that the security establishment of Pakistan is harbouring militants, such a demand is no more than a fool’s errand.

The question whether the predatory strikes are being carried out with the consent of the Pakistani government is important. But a more important question is whether and how the attacks can be brought to an end. Surely, the strikes have given rise to strong resentment across the country, especially in their theatre – the northwestern Pakistan. At the same time, they have watered down public support for the war on terror not merely because they’re a violation of national sovereignty but also for the reason that they claim innocent lives. Without public support the war can hardly be won. But the Americans think otherwise and look upon the drone raids as an essential component of their counterterrorism strategy. So they have to be prevailed upon to eschew this tactic.

This brings us back to square one. Who’ll rein in the Americans and how? Granted that the ruling establishment is not in cahoots with Washington on the predatory raids, and rather it’s keen to have them halted, their efforts in the form of diplomacy, including third-party intervention, haven’t borne fruit. What other options do we have up our sleeve? Our nuclear-power status, coupled with massive military might, have constituted a strong deterrence against the drone strikes. The fact that it hasn’t means that we’re deficient in some other respects, which has constrained our capability to check American intrusion. Undoubtedly, the economy is the Achilles’ heel. Regardless of the tall claims of the people at the helm, of safeguarding national sovereignty and having put the economy back on track, the fact is that we’re a country of addicts and are in dire need of foreign capital inflows to keep the wheels of the economy moving. There’s no dearth of people – rich politicians, big landlords, business tycoons, professionals, entertainers and sportspersons – who brag about their patriotic credentials while at the same time conveniently evading contributing to the national exchequer.

In a population of 180 million, only 1.7 million pay income tax. The overwhelming majority of the taxpayers come from the salaried class, whose tax is deducted at source. We’ve one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios in the world and the public revenue lags behind even day-to-day expenditure. All talks of widening the tax net seem merely a political gimmick, and if the finance minister is to be taken at his word, it’s the popularly elected parliament that’s hindering revenue reforms. Little wonder, then, that the begging bowl has become a national symbol making a mockery of the hollow claims of our being a sovereign nation. At the moment, the government is lining up for another IMF credit line – the current one having saved us from an imminent default. A country whose economy is too weak to operate without the crutches of foreign assistance can be called sovereign only by courtesy.

Of course, one may argue that the government should break the begging bowl and take bold decisions, notwithstanding the state of the economy. There are nations whose economic health is as fragile as ours, or even more. But this economic fragility doesn’t mean that they’ll let another country break into their territory at will. So, the argument goes, Pakistan ought to stand up against drone attacks even if it means saying goodbye to American economic assistance.

Yes, national independence needs to be safeguarded at all cost. But are we willing to pay the cost? Do we have the leadership which can spearhead the struggle for national independence? A leadership, on either side of the political divide, which is addicted to a luxurious and pompous lifestyle and looks to external powers for staying in or entering the corridors of power, can hardly put up a bold stance before the Americans, or for that matter any other powerful state. They can’t, so to speak, bell the cat.

In a word, whether we like it or not, we’re condemned to face the drone raids into our territory until the US itself realises that persisting with this tactic in the war on terror is uncalled-for, if not damaging, to its own cause.

Talking to the Taliban

An increase in the high-level interaction between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the seemingly significant recent shift in the US policy towards the Afghan Taliban should have brightened the prospects for peace in the Af-Pak region. However, there is still no sight of a breakthrough that would bring the conflict to an end through political, instead of military means.

Instead, one feels that the Taliban position has hardened parallel to the softening of the stance taken by President Hamid Karzai’s beleaguered government in Kabul. It is possible that the Taliban interpret the repeated offers of talks by Karzai and his Western backers as indicative of a weakening resolve on the part of the US-led coalition forces arrayed against them or even as a sign of looming defeat for their enemies.

Taliban haven’t felt there is a need for them to sit at the negotiating table until their core demand of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan is met. They haven’t been weakened enough to sue for peace on the terms presented by their foes. Defeated or weakened, the Taliban would be less inclined to negotiate and settle for an unfavourable power-sharing arrangement in Afghanistan.

In fact, there won’t be any need to negotiate with the Taliban facing defeat. If the Taliban are unwilling to negotiate with the Afghan government from a position of strength in which they are apparently placed at present, there isn’t much hope that they would agree to talk in case they become weak and are on the verge of defeat. And as the current NATO[1] strategy is based on this flawed premise, there cannot be much hope that it would succeed.

Two recent developments should be kept in mind while analysing the Afghan conflict and the prospects for peace in the wider Af-Pak region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s February 2011 speech at the Asia Society in New York signalled a major, little-noticed shift in US policy towards the Taliban. No longer was the US insisting on the ‘red lines’ for the Taliban to first renounce violence, abandon al-Qaeda and abide by the Afghan constitution before they could be allowed to join any political process. As Hillary Clinton explained, these three conditions were being set aside to henceforth serve as the necessary outcome of the peace talks with the Taliban.

As her choice of words explained, it was distasteful and even unimaginable for her to talk to an enemy as brutal as the Taliban, but the US had to do this due to the needs of diplomacy and the demands of the situation. Even a superpower has its limitations and the US as a pragmatic great power was conceding its inability to force a military solution to the Afghan conflict.

Indeed, it would be difficult for the US and its Western allies to justify talking to the Taliban after having demonised them for years and having tried every tactic to defeat them. After 10 years of war and at the cost of many lives and huge funds, the US finally appears to have realised that it would be less costly and embarrassing to strike a deal with the rag-tag Taliban.

The second important development was the visit of Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani to Kabul in the company of Army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) head Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha and defense, interior and foreign ministers. Representing Afghanistan in the talks were President Karzai, his Army chief General Bismillah Khan, the Intelligence Directorate Head Rahmatullah Nabil and defense, interior and foreign ministers. In the words of Prime Minister Gilani, it was to show that Pakistan’s civil and military leadership and all state institutions were “on the same page” over the issue of Afghanistan’s stability. To quote him again, he also wanted to inform the world that the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan had introspected deeply and could discern friends from foes.

It was the first time that the civil and military leadership of the two neighbouring Islamic countries engaged in their own wars against militancy and extremism came together under one roof and discussed the challenges facing them. Both Gilani and Karzai appeared overwhelmed by the occasion and the latter termed it historic as it was his initiative to bring the two leaderships closer in a bid to achieve reconciliation with the Mullah Mohammad Omar-led Taliban[2].

A major outcome of the visit was the decision to upgrade the Pak-Afghan Peace and Conciliation Commission, established in January this year, to a two-tier body so that the chief executives of Afghanistan and Pakistan along with the army and intelligence chiefs and foreign and interior ministers could sit in the first, higher tier to facilitate decision-making.

A related development was the deterioration in the already difficult relationship between Pakistan and the US, two uncertain allies fighting the war with different objectives. The damage to their ties caused by the incident involving the disguised CIA operative Raymond Davis hasn’t been repaired even though Pakistan’s civil and military authorities behaved embarrassingly to facilitate his release. The presence of many more such CIA agents disguised as ‘diplomats’ and ‘military trainers’ in Pakistan continues to poison relations between the two countries.

Another emotive issue is the unchallenged use of the CIA-operated drones by the US to attack militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. The botched drone strikes in recent weeks have killed scores of civilians and caused outrage in Pakistan, but the US has arrogantly dismissed criticism of its actions and refused to mend its ways. The statement by the CIA Chief Leon Panetta was instructive after meeting with ISI Head Lt Gen Pasha that he would continue to take action as part of his duty to protect American citizens. It is another matter that the ‘action’ being taken by the CIA to protect Americans often amounts to extra-judicial killings of people of other nations.

With so much distrust in their relations, it would be surprising if Pakistan and the US were able to work together to pursue military or political objectives vis-à-vis the Taliban. It also makes one wonder whether the US approved the recent high-level talks between the Afghan and Pakistani leaders and their decision to form and use the joint peace and conciliation commission for reconciling with Kabul’s armed opponents.

More importantly, one has to wait for the Taliban response to the deepening of the relationship between Islamabad and Kabul and the likely effect it would have on the Afghan peace process. The Taliban have rejected Turkey’s offer to host Taliban office to facilitate contacts as part of the peace initiative. President Karzai and President Asif Ali Zardari had backed the Turkish initiative, but the Taliban have made it clear that Turkey as a NATO[3] member with troops in Afghanistan isn’t neutral and is thus unable to act as a peacemaker. The first choice for the Taliban to set up an office is their homeland, Afghanistan, followed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Once they make up their mind to negotiate, the Taliban would prefer talking to the Americans instead of the Afghan government in view of their stated position that Karzai is a puppet of the US and hence powerless.

It won’t be easy for the Taliban to agree to a power-sharing arrangement with Karzai after fighting for 10 long years with his government and the NATO[4] forces. Taliban field commanders and hardliners could revolt against Mullah Omar and his shura if he settled for some berths in the cabinet or for control of certain southern provinces. Just like the Karzai government in which hawkish elements mostly belonging to non-Pashtun groups oppose reconciliation with the Taliban, Mullah Omar’s followers too are divided into factions that differ over the likely solution of the Afghan conflict. There are also limits to Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban, who won’t make a deal that goes against their own interests. Karzai wants Pakistan to deliver the Taliban to him, but Islamabad risks alienating the Taliban if it were to push hard to make this happen.

Back to ‘with us or against us

“Director Leon Panetta (informed ISI chief Gen Shuja Pasha) that he has a duty to prevent attacks on the United States…..and he will not halt operations that support that objective,” said an official of the CIA. The fact that the message was given to Gen Pasha within hours of his arrival in Washington last week says it all. The row which was simmering has boiled over. The Wall Street Journal went one better. It advised Washington to confront Pakistan with the same choice as Bush had done in 2001: “Are you with us or against us?”

The Americans have, in a manner of speaking, thrown down the gauntlet, and now it is up to Pakistan to either pick it up and accept the challenge or walk away. Although both sides are playing it down for their own reasons, it was in many ways a seminal moment. And, in retrospect, it may mark the beginning of the end of a relationship that has always vacillated between attraction and repulsion, with both sides realising that a bitter parting would be fraught with dangerous consequences, initially more for Pakistan but eventually also for the US and the region.

The Americans have probably calculated that Pakistan will whinge and whine at first but eventually fall in line, because it is in dire straits financially, lacking resources, facing an economic meltdown; and it is also a fractured society, hobbled by a weak government and an overstretched army. The prospect of lucre conveyed through such schemes as proffered by Kerry-Lugar may well have encouraged the impression in the administration that Pakistan can be had for a price.

Our ambassador in Washington encouraged such a view when he told his American interlocutors, in a fit of unbecoming candour, that Pakistanis are by nature “rug merchants” who may initially ask for a steep price but will settle for a trifling amount if properly bargained with. And, indeed, such seems the hunger for dollars here that both may be right. Except that the stakes now are not quantifiable only in dollars. Our differences are stark. In fact, they are distinct, diverse, sheer opposite, antipodes. Worse, while we want to pour balm upon the battleground we feel that the US vexes us.

How, then, will this government react to the American ultimatum? To the astonishment of many, Mr Gilani said he plans to enlist the help of SAARC members to persuade Washington not to have recourse to drones. Goaded by him, tiny Maldives will presumably be making a demarche to the US on this score. Mr Zardari has said nothing, because his First Commandment is not to defy America.

As for the opposition, Shahbaz Sharif asked the nation to forego Kerry-Lugar handouts, as if that will force the Americans to change their mind. The opposition’s advantage is that, while they have little power, they have absolutely no responsibility – “the prerogative of the harlot through the ages,” in the words of Stanley Baldwin.

The military’s usual reaction to such predicaments is to hide behind the government while maintaining a loud silence. But it’s no secret who runs the war effort or who signs off on policy. The Americans, like the rest of us, see it in practice every day and know better than to blame the powerless civilians. When dismissing Gen Pasha’s request out of hand, the Americans obviously felt they had the measure of our military and there was virtually nothing to fear. The military now risks earning public ridicule if they refuse to pick up the gauntlet.

Many had hoped that the undeserved strictures in the US biannual report that the military had not performed well would provide the incentive the army needed to finally consider disentangling Pakistan from the suffocating American embrace. However, others claiming they know better, predict nothing of the sort would happen. “Whatever their misgivings and suspicions about America’s motives, the Pakistani military will remain fixated on the American alliance just as it is obsessed about India,” said one military pundit. Perhaps that’s why the military has never developed an alternative strategy that will enable Pakistan to carry on without their American lifeline.

One reason why we have never embarked on such an exercise is the dysfunctional relationship that exists between civilian governments and the armed forces. The former are ever wary of the military and the latter barely able to conceal their contempt for the “bloody civilians.” So unless there is a mutual awakening the sea change in attitudes required to draw up a plan slipping the American chokehold is unlikely.

Even if such cooperation is possible, there are some hard issues and challenges ahead in the grim circumstances we face today. Despite the inestimable value of our long-term strategic ties with China, there isn’t much that Beijing can do to alleviate our problems with our neighbours – Afghanistan and India. China can, of course, help us rebuild our economy by engaging in mega projects and other business investments but that cannot happen on a significant scale and on a sustained basis unless our internal security improves significantly and we can demonstrate dominance over armed outfits with extremist agendas.

With India our problems have grown into bizarre proportions and the popular view that India is out to get us makes the problem of reining in our hostility to India that much more difficult. Unless, therefore, confidence-building measures with India make substantial gains, there is little hope that we will be able to reconsider our anti India stance and, of course, there is little hope that India will do likewise.

India is a sizeable economic power and a fast emerging rival of China. As such, its growing preoccupation with China means that Pakistan’s importance will decline in relative terms and the potential threat it can pose to India militarily will become a lot less. Hence, India has lesser reasons than in the past to worry about Pakistan, except as a source of terrorism (Mumbai-style), or if extremists seize power and lay their hands on our nuclear arsenal. While we believe this can never happen, outsiders looking in take a different view of our deteriorating situation.

With regard to Afghanistan an understanding with Kabul on ways of accommodating the Taliban will be a major breakthrough, as it would help us concentrate on tackling the TTP. But that won’t be easy. Kabul is suspicious of our game, believing that it has not changed much since the 1990s. Perhaps Gilani’s recent visit and the setting up of a joint high-powered body including the army chiefs will dampen Afghan suspicions.

To further complicate the situation, there is some doubt about how much influence we have over the Afghan Taliban, who are fiercely independent and unpredictable. They did little to settle the Durand Line with us when they were ensconced in power with our assistance and support. Unless, therefore, they return as a part of a peace deal, old rivalries will revive, the civil war resume and proxy wars ensue, enabling outside powers to establish a foothold in Afghanistan.

Internally too we face a difficult situation. Extremist groups initially nurtured by us as instruments of an overly ambitious foreign policy have become so entrenched that they have cowed down and marginalised moderate groups as well as the silent majority. Either due to inertia or contagion, our strategic thinking does not seem to have evolved since the 1990s. What started off as a solution to our external challenges has evolved into our most implacable problem.

Survival of the fittest is a well known phrase but one that can be easily misunderstood leading to blunders. “Fitness” is not physical strength alone or power to dominate others but, most importantly, the ability to adapt to changing circumstances and to handle them skilfully. This Darwinian principle applies to strategic policy with equal force. Our policies, therefore, must evolve in the light of far-reaching developments because clinging to the old paradigms, as we (and India) are at the moment, is folly.