The magnificent performance of the rank and file of the Army fighting the counter-insurgency in Swat is no surprise. Whether in Kashmir in 1947-48, Dir in 1958 and 1976, the Rann of Kutch, occupied Kashmir (Operation Gibraltar) and later in the full-fledged war of 1965, during the 1971 war, in the Balochistan counter-insurgency in 1973-5, Siachen continuously since 1985, in Kargil in 1998 and in FATA since 2004 (and many more small conflicts that would take many more pages), officers and men have kept their commitment.
The average officer-to-soldier ratio in combat fatalities during conventional operations being 1:17 or 1:18 in most Armies represents the command structure at the field level functioning adequately, young officers (including lieutenant colonels) leading rather than sending men to their deaths. In the Pakistan Army and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), the superior 1:10 or 1:11 average through many conflicts means that the young officers are far more enthusiastic at leading from the front in the face of fire. This ratio is also usually higher among commandos (Special Forces).
The 100-plus fatalities to-date reveals a disproportionate number of officers in combat-related deaths, the ratio in Swat reportedly 1:5 or 1:6 being unusually high. Sons of a number of ex-servicemen (including friends of mine) have given the ultimate sacrifice for their nation, this is a great indication (and vindication) of the moral fibre of this Army. One cannot eulogise such men, fathers and sons, in mere words.
The operational plan is sound. The concept of overwhelming force was applied, and from concentric directions. Always a difficult proposition, the problems is force-multiplied in mountainous terrain without adequate heliborne mobility. What was achieved without such capability is remarkable, a tribute to the outstanding pilots of Army Aviation. The Taliban did not expect the Army to move so swiftly from different directions and with such determination, particularly against dominating heights where they were well dug in. To limit collateral damage in the towns, the Army took the calculated risk that the Taliban would leave their fortified positions in built-up areas and come and attack them. This was a fatal miscalculation, rather wishful thinking, compounded by the fact that road exits and mountain passes were not all blocked, possibly due to paucity of human and equipment resources. That is where a shortage of helicopters was critical, but it does not seem to have been militarily appreciated. This permitted a large number of Taliban to melt away, mostly in pickup trucks, with time and vehicular capacity to even take away their generators.
It is of vital importance when going after insurgents to target their leadership, locating and eliminating leaders like Fazlullah and Shah Doran. The inability to eliminate their top leadership is most probably due to inadequate intelligence rather than intent. With the Army’s presence in some strength giving the locals confidence, optimum use must be made of information gleaned from all sources. Unless the hardcore Taliban are eliminated they will always have the capacity and potential to come back in strength.
People with credibility and capability are needed to reach a sound assessment. Two outstanding veterans of different vintage with a track record of being blunt helped answer my queries. Both readily admitted that the Taliban were far better trained, equipped and motivated than the opponents they faced during their period. Capt (later Brig) Manto was the SSG company commander in the Dir operations in 1958. He took over Maj Ziauddin Abbasi Shaheed’s Bravo Squadron (Sept 11) in Guides Cavalry during war and commanded 26 Cavalry in battle in Chamb in 1971. In 1976 as CO 36 Baloch Lt Col (later Lt Gen) Lehrasab, who entered occupied Kashmir as part of Operation Gibraltar in 1965 as a lieutenant and was wounded grievously, being the last to be medically evacuated from East Pakistan in 1971, took the surrender of tribals in Dir.
A well planned operation is falling short because of shortage of adequate intelligence and heliborne resources. We should brace ourselves for long-drawn guerrilla warfare that could tie the Army down while eating away the moral and material resources of the country. For a third opinion (and I deliberately did not turn to another genuine hero, my old CO Brig Mohammad Taj, SJ and Bar, for reasons that could have been embarrassing to the ISI), but someone who (like his course-mate Lehrasab) has shed blood for this country, his rifle company being almost wiped out, refusing to surrender when completely surrounded in East Pakistan in December 1971. Grievously wounded, Maj (later Brig) Akram woke up days later in captivity in an Indian Army Hospital. Nobody could recognise this hero’s emaciated self when he walked out of captivity in 1973. Presently helping in relief operations deep inside Malakand, Brig (Retd) Akram sent me an SMS that about sums it all up. “Our security agencies are still doing a lousy job. They virtually have no information on extremists’ leadership. Operations going very slow, lack of aggressiveness and absence of coordination is visible. Contents of daily sitrep (situation reports) as if fighting (is) taking place between two regular forces. More when we meet!”
Instead of turning to the motivated with a gift of the gab, Kayani could take counsel from the likes of Manto, Lehrasab and Akram, and many others like him who have really fought (and not just talked the good talk) for this country, even shed blood for it. Their experience and sacrifice may give you that cutting edge in a fight that we must win. And maybe spare a thought for those fathers whose sons have already given the ultimate sacrifice for their country as was their wont and earnest desire. Only superior generalship and true rendition of the cause, not pandering subservience to the Constitution as it stands today, a controversial document mutilated by the black NRO, will make their supreme sacrifice worth the blood they have spilt for this nation.
