Originally under the control of the Nawab of Dir the area has been divided, subdivided and seen battles for ownership by local groups. The latest battle is one that the state of Pakistan must solely take responsibility for. A decades-long blundering and short-sighted policy has finally taken its toll. Now tanks and troops roll in to rectify the damage. Not an easy undertaking. Hundreds of thousands of the population is displaced, foreign insurgents freely hound our places and people are striking unholy alliances. The weakened state, rather a collaborating state is now attempting to make amends. It’s a tough task. But one that cannot be ignored.
The strategic significance of Lower Dir is illustrated by the fact that on its west lies Afghanistan, on its south is Malakand and Bajaur, in its north is Chitral and on its east lies Swat. Of Lower Dir’s approximately 130,000 population essentially 79 percent have left for safer places.
The local forces essentially consist of the Frontier Corps, known as Dir Scouts in the area. The Taliban have mounted offensive attacks gradually since end- March. Tensions have now spread to Upper Dir has well. The military commander maintain there is peace in five of the seven Lower Dir tehsils but what is seem while driving towards Maidaan,Chakdara and Gulabad signs of peace and security are not visible.
By mid-March violence raged in the area. The dates were of significance. None other than the local Frontier Corps commanders correlated the signing of first the February agreement between the NWFP government and the TNSM and the Nizam-e-Adl in April.
This reassertion of the Taliban was helped by the movements in the neighbouring Mohmand Agency’s Mohmaghat post. Mohmand provides the basic linkage between Bajaur, Dir and Waziristan. The significance of Bajaur is relevant for Lower Dir as well. With Kandharo, the place where the Taliban had their base where there had training camps and force concentration, has road access to Lower Dir.
It was in Kandharo that the Taliban declared the existence of an alternate Lal Masjid. Soon after the Lal Masjid operation was conducted the local Taliban set up a “Lal Masjid” in a mosque adjacent to the Hajisahib Tarangazis shrine. It is this mosque which the Taliban turned into their base. On a huge wall there are names of the Taliban who were killed during the operation. Kandharo, hence, is the hub from where Taliban are supplied to other surrounding areas, including Lower Dir.
The state has hitherto not been able to prevent the movement of inter-agency Taliban. Indeed, a tall order! What however is important is that the government must stop the easy movement of foreign militants from Kunar and Nagharhar in Afghanistan to the Suran Valley and beyond.
Buoyed by their foreign support, for example in Lower Dir, about 10 school kids were killed in a suicide bombing attack. Following that about 10 major blasts took place, killing dozens of locals. An estimated 80 people died. A local commercial bank manager was kidnapped and later killed. Similarly a DCO was also killed in early April. The kidnappers demanded a Rs20-million ransom. Finally they killed him. A similar fate awaited a local tehsildar. The hitherto banned FM radio station became active. Regular Taliban intercepts picked up indicated influx of foreign Taliban using the Kunar Valley-Suran Valley routes near Momandghat post bordering Bajaur and the Mohmand Agency.
Finally the government and the GHQ agreed to launch an operation between the night of April 25-26, with the Dir Scouts using two army units and an armoured unit. An about 2,000-strong force, including logistical support, was launched. Maidan aread was attacked. The significance of Maidan lies in its being the hub of Sufi Mohammad, the TNSM chief. The famous Qambar Bazaar passes through this stronghold–essentially Sufi Mohammad’s residential area. Sufi Mohmamad’s following has naturally been the strongest here. Above the Qambar Bazaar lies a strategically important post, the Kalapani post.
Kalapani lies at a height, just the perfect vantage point from where to hit the enemy from a height. Linked to Kalapani is a matted road which comes onto Qambar Bazaar, giving access to those who control the Kalapnai post. Two other important posts that fall in the Maidan area are the Lala Qila and the Qambar posts.
According to the army’s own estimates they are a fighting a force of no more than 500 to 600 Taliban. However, in the fishbowl battlefield of Maidan the strategic heights count. All Bajaur commanders repeatedly indicate that numerical superiority does not matter in the counter-insurgency battles fought in the mountainous terrain. The battle is treacherous. The IEDs are vastly spread. The locals can be on either side. Along the Timergarah-Maidan Road there are no guaranteed safe paths. In a quarter kilometre distance the media was taken by the army surrounded by hundred armed men, a tank ahead of us and dozens of troops perched on the jeep in which we sat. This is no safety zone in which civilians will return.
The Taliban too manage to go on the offensive. For example recently in Hayat Sarai the Taliban laid an ambush was a major surprise attack by the Taliban. Taliban had RPGs and mines and gave the army a tough fight.
It’s a tough task all around. The occasional civilians seen on the roads wear the look of fear. Initially they worked with locals worked with an approach to co-existence with the Taliban initially. They asked them to say their prayers in the mosque, they offered to provide them protection, to pray for Allah’s blessings. But subsequently they demanded that these people make financial contributions and also contribution. There is an appreciation that the operation may have brought destruction but there is hope that it may bring peace and security in the region.
Irrespective of what news may trickle out from either the Taliban or the army the fact is that the battle for Kalpani post and the control of the Qambar-Timergarah road still rages. Indeed reports suggest that the battle will be over soon. It is unlikely that a definitive answer is in the offing.
The counterinsurgency strategy is a tough one to implement.
