The aim of any counterinsurgency is to eliminate insurgents. While securing and holding territory is certainly a prime consideration, unless the insurgents are killed or captured, mainly their principal leaders, an insurgency has the capacity to build on itself. In Swat the Army has done a splendid job in quickly establishing its presence in almost the entire territory, and in killing a substantial number of insurgents. Despite its commendable sacrifices, particularly by the officers’ corps, it has fallen way short of its principal mission, eliminating the insurgent threat. In fact, one may even be anxious about the future. Enough insurgents have escaped to threaten a long-term guerrilla war. That leads us straight to the humanitarian question, are conditions now conducive to the return of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) be created?
Even though time was of the essence, it is clear that the consequences of the military action in Swat (and adjoining territories) was not well thought out, either in civilian or military circles. The inherent weakness of the civil administration, both at the federal and provincial line, to cater for the humanitarian crises was not anticipated. Not only intelligence but media reports had indicated that the militants were using terrain where heights give them physical domination of the area. Also, the military should have been in no doubt that the fighting would create a major civilian exodus.
According to a military briefing at the highest level, the operation was conducted from four difficult directions. The concentric nature meant to occupy vital ground and force the militants to abandon their fortified positions in built-up areas, and come and fight the military on the ground of their choosing. This was brilliant, it worked because it spared tremendous collateral damage to the towns. However, it had a very fatal flaw. The militants believed in the classic guerrilla theory propounded by the Godless Mao Tsetung: “He who fights and runs away lives to fight another day.” By avoiding the elimination of their top leadership and a considerable portion of their cadres, the stage has been set for a classic guerrilla compaign. The initiative is therefore now passed into the hands of the Taliban despite the grievous losses inflicted upon them by the Army in field combat, the Army is now on the defensive and the guerrillas have the capacity for hit and run tactics on static posts and along the lines of communication. What have the Army learnt from the sorry experience of FATA?
While the government has to be commended for immediately created the Strategic Support Group (SSG), and appointing a veteran from the Earthquake Relief and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) to lead it, what are the resources allocated to the SSG to cater to the catastrophe? Given that an Army Engineer Brigade is mending the rounds and relevant infrastructure of Swat, including electricity, water and sewage, it is quite likely that with increased guerrilla activity, the IDPs go back only partly—i.e., send back only able-bodied men to reclaim their hearths and home and livestock (or whatever is left of it) and leave most old people, women and children in the camps, as was the case in the Afghan refugee camps, in exist once now for nearly three decades later. While it is good news that permanent Army cantonments are planned in Swat, what is needed is far more dynamic military thinking that takes in air mobility as the prime instrument of countering military guerilla activity. Regretfully, the answer to a direct question about heliborne capacity was extremely disappointing.
Something is clearly deficient if any military commander cannot understand that enhanced air mobility is vital in any counter-insurgency, both during battle and afterwards.
One must counter civilian guerilla activity by winning over the hearts and minds of the local population, in the present insecure circumstances that will be a hard sell. The prime mission must be to restore the civil administration as soon as possible. One is heartened by the fact that the Army has handed over the names of 4000 ex-servicemen locally from NWFP to be employed as policemen. This is a tremendous government indicative and must be commended. Why not go further and induct retired ex-servicemen from the NWFP in the civil administration on contract? They could be employed to fill the vacuum created for various reasons, but this decision is required immediately. While in theory the prime responsibility for dealing with the populace is that of politicians, these are special circumstances. We need to extend the mandate of the Special Support Group akin to that of a civilian administration working in tending with the military till full normalcy in administration is restored, we cannot afford to take chances.
If I remember correctly, the correct military teaching is that you do not win a war only by occupying territory. You win a war by eliminating the threat completely. A counterinsurgency is something like a fumigation of a building, equating bad governance to the cockroaches in the nooks and corners within the building. You have to block off all exits and prevent the cockroaches from exiting. While on the ground, the troops have performed above and beyond the call of duty in the tactical sense, in the strategic sense we may have created conditions that spell a disaster in the looming.
We are in trouble. No, let me correct that, we are in deep trouble. Islamabad, we have a problem!
