Better alive than dead?

The ISPR has stated the victory over the Taliban would not be complete until the top leadership was defeated. 

This of course makes sense. The dramatic story of Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers, who were eventually forced to surrender after a 25-year struggle as they were cornered in a piece of jungle barely larger than a football field, is one that ends too with the death of 

Velupillai Prabhakaran – the elusive leader who pioneered the suicide belt and from his jungle hide-out ordered a series of high-profile kidnappings, including that in 1991 of Indian Prime Minsiter Rajiv Gandhi. But in the context of Pakistan, where death is associated by extremists with martyrdom, the army suggestion that final victory can come with the killing of men like Maulana Fazlullah, who the ISPR says has already been targeted thrice, raises some questions.

This is also borne out by the chilling interview given to ‘The Sunday Times’ by the man known as ‘Colonel Imam’. Between 1979 and 1989, Amir Sultan Tarar, himself trained at Fort Bragg and courted by US presidents, helped raise the mujahideen army that defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan and then played a key role in raising the Taliban force that eventually over-ran the country. Men like Mullah Omar rank among his pupils. Like a handful of ISI officers, he is believed to have retained links with the militants even after his former US mentors changed their stance. Today, Tarar warns the Taliban can never be defeated and that each death will lead to more supporters rising to replace the man who fell. This may be an exaggeration, but it would be unwise to completely dismiss the warning. The building up of militants as martyrs has played a part in their phenomenal growth. This is true not only in the tribal areas, where the notion of an ‘eye for eye’ justice remains strongly rooted, but even in towns like Gujranwala where squares have been re-named for jihadi ‘heroes’ and which has seen a series of crimes motivated by extremism, including the 2007 murder of Punjab minister Zill-e-Huma, shot dead by a fanatic who opposed a role for women in public life. Similar sentiments can be detected in other places. Even in Lahore, there are those who seek still to defend the Taliban, and to blame the bombings in our cities on some plot hatched in Washington. 

These factors mean that the state may need to rise above ideas of vengeance and revenge. Rather than deliberately attempting to kill Fazalullah and others who form the top tier of Taliban leadership, perhaps we need to focus on the need to bring them to courts – and to lay out the truth before people. Too many facets of this truth remain hidden. People in Swat need a chance to talk openly of Fazalullah’s own role in extortion; of rape and sodomy committed by his men. The refusal by state agencies to come clean is one reason why men like Hafiz Muhammad Saeed are able to walk out unpunished after periods in detention, waving confidently to supporters and making speeches about ‘moderation’. The stories told by ‘Colonel Imam’ testify to the close links that have existed between the state and the extremists. The existence of this nexus alone explains why men like Hafiz Saeed or Maulana Masood Azhar seem able to time and again escape the reach of the law without even facing charges. We need now to squarely confront this past; to talk about it openly and to admit to mistakes made. Otherwise the blackmail hold of militant leaders who threaten to divulge details of these ties in order to coerce the authorities into silence will remain intact and prevent the process of prosecution and justice that is at this point essential.

Through history, there are many examples of the manner in which death bestows immortality. We need to guard against this. The sight of men like Fazalullah and Muslim Khan in the dock would help dispel the myths that still persist. In Swat there is some evidence that these are being deliberately propagated, by the remnants of the Taliban, who speak of their ‘escape’ as evidence that God has sided with them. There is a need to challenge such assertions and the myths that will in time evolve.

More too needs to be done. Looked at it retrospect, there is no doubt the Afghan war that began with the Soviet invasion of that country in 1979 altered the contours of our society. General Ziaul Haq’s opportunistic ‘Islamization’ and the US policies pursued at the time contributed to this. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has accepted this without further attempts to deny the past. But in the period that followed the dark Zia years, fundamental errors were made. After every war, an attempt to re-assimilate combatants is necessary. People engaged in fighting need to be re-introduced to the different pattern and priorities of life in times of peace, assisted in the role of re-adaption to changed circumstances. This requirement has been completely overlooked. The thousands of young fighters who were encouraged at various points to take up arms in the name of ‘jihad’ were never deprogrammed or offered other roles in society. In Swat, those who went with Sufi Mohammad Khan to Afghanistan in 2001 to fight US-led forces were in many cases simply released back into society when they returned as angry, defeated warriors some of whom had faced mistreatment in Afghan jails. These men, some no more than teenagers when they were recruited by Sufi, today form in many cases the ranks of the Taliban in the Valley.

We need a rehabilitation plan for them and for others who have since been herded into madressahs and other training institutions. For many of these boys, power stems only from the gun they see in the hands of others and yearn to hold themselves. A similar phenomenon was seen in Kashmir as militancy emerged in that once-peaceful region. A well-planned policy is needed to turn it back and to demonstrate to people that there are indeed other ways of getting ahead in life. Somehow, the cycle of vendetta and violence needs to be broken. Simplistic arguments being put forward say the people of NWFP, the families who lost loved ones in the current conflict will seek revenge. It is said suicide bombers include those who lost relatives as a result of armed action in Waziristan or elsewhere.

There may be some element of truth in these assertions. But what needs to be emphasized is the importance of moving beyond it, of lifting people up from their past and encouraging them to look towards the future. The government now needs to work towards carving out this future. For many people none currently seems to exist. Involving them in the process of creating one, by offering education, jobs, opportunity – and at the same time dispensing justice in an open and fair manner – may be the key to turning back the tide of militancy and ensuring it does not in the future return to flood our society.

Waziristan – Final Battle?

The Wazirs are a more warlike Pakhtoon tribe than the Durranis, Lodhis, Suris and Ghalzais who ruled the subcontinent. They inhabit South and North Waziristan in Pakistan and Birmal, Matun districts in Afghanistan. Wazirs preferred a life of isolation, or they could have established a dynasty in the subcontinent. 

In 1979, when the Russian forces entered Afghanistan. The Americans found an opportunity to contain communism and settle scores with the USSR. Billions of dollars were pumped in to make Pakhtoons fight against Pakhtoons. The Pakhtoons had a rich culture of tolerance, openness, moderation, music, poetry and art. In the NWFP and FATA, Sikhs, Hindus and other minorities enjoyed equal rights. Never had any communal riots occurred. Sikhs and Hindus lived peacefully in Afridi and Orakzai Tirah for ages, where no Pakistani official could enter until 2002. Both North and South Waziristan were used as bases for the Afghan jihad. A few local youths, influenced by the jihadis, joined them to fight against the Russians. Though the impact of jihad, on the Pakhtoon culture of Waziristan, was not very significant, the seeds of extremism were sown in these areas.

The Durand Line divided tribes in six tribal agencies .The line, since not demarcated on ground, was never considered as border by tribal. Cross border, movement was a routine. The shinwaris of Landikotal would go to Jalalabad to play football matches. Tribal from Pakistan were member of afghan parliament. Political dynamics of Afghanistan always have a strong impact on FATA. In September 1996, Taliban captured Kabul. Inspired by their success, local Taliban became active in Mir Ali Tehsil of North Waziristan by 1998. Utmanzai Wazir and Dawar are the main tribes, while Kharsins, Siadgis, Gurbaz, and Malakshi Mahsud also reside in North Waziristan. Few men from these tribes joined afghan Taliban to fight against Northern Alliance.Baitullah Mahsud was one of them. His father, Mulana Haroon, was imam Masjid in Bannu Cantonment. Baitullah was born and brought up in Bannu. He got religious education from a madrassa in Daud Shah, Bannu and for some time he studied in a Miranshah madrassa. He remained an Imam Masjid in Mati Mamman Khel village in Jani Khel area of FR Bannu. After 9/11, he moved to his ancestral area of Shabi khel Mahsud in South Waziristan.

Foreign militants entered Waziristan in March 2002 in the aftermath of operation ANACONDA, conducted by NATO forces in Shahi Kot area of Paktiya province. Baitullah was then not well known in Waziristan. Shelter to foreign militant was provided by Ahmadzai Wazirs of Wana. Nek Mohammad,Sharif Khan,Noor Ul Islam,Omer were the prominent facilitators.Ahmedzai Wazir and Mahsuds are the main tribes of South Waziristan,while Dotanis,Suleman Khel and Urmers also inhabit the area.Mahsuds and Ahmedzai wazirs have never enjoyed cordial relations.. Since foreign militants were mainly in Wazir areas therefore to isolate them, an agreement was inked with Baitullah Mahsud in February 2005. The deal made, was in good faith, to isolate Ahmadzai Wazirs and to ensure that Biatullah men do not conduct operation across the border. During the next 2 years Baitullah consolidated, his position .He formed Tahreek E Taliban Pakistan in December 2007, with the support of Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda’s leadership. He was declared Amir of TTP.

The army’s final battle is likely to be fought against Baitullah in South Waziristan. The remnants of terrorist from Swat,Mohmand,Orakzai,Kurram,Darra, are likely to fall back to South Waziristan.The elements of banned jiahadi organizations, lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba, Jaish and other jihadis are likely to join this battle for their survival. Timely and successful completion of the Malakand operation will have immense effects on future operations. Extraordinary security arrangements should be made to make the job of suicide bombers difficult. The nation is already geared up for the cause of the IDPs. A quick, transparent and efficient mechanism for reconstruction of conflict areas should be designed and executed. Pakistan is at war and we must win it for our future generations to enable them to live a life of their choice, especially for the daughters of this nation.

Avoiding a quagmire?

The magnificent performance of the rank and file of the Army fighting the counter-insurgency in Swat is no surprise. Whether in Kashmir in 1947-48, Dir in 1958 and 1976, the Rann of Kutch, occupied Kashmir (Operation Gibraltar) and later in the full-fledged war of 1965, during the 1971 war, in the Balochistan counter-insurgency in 1973-5, Siachen continuously since 1985, in Kargil in 1998 and in FATA since 2004 (and many more small conflicts that would take many more pages), officers and men have kept their commitment.

The average officer-to-soldier ratio in combat fatalities during conventional operations being 1:17 or 1:18 in most Armies represents the command structure at the field level functioning adequately, young officers (including lieutenant colonels) leading rather than sending men to their deaths. In the Pakistan Army and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), the superior 1:10 or 1:11 average through many conflicts means that the young officers are far more enthusiastic at leading from the front in the face of fire. This ratio is also usually higher among commandos (Special Forces). 

The 100-plus fatalities to-date reveals a disproportionate number of officers in combat-related deaths, the ratio in Swat reportedly 1:5 or 1:6 being unusually high. Sons of a number of ex-servicemen (including friends of mine) have given the ultimate sacrifice for their nation, this is a great indication (and vindication) of the moral fibre of this Army. One cannot eulogise such men, fathers and sons, in mere words. 

The operational plan is sound. The concept of overwhelming force was applied, and from concentric directions. Always a difficult proposition, the problems is force-multiplied in mountainous terrain without adequate heliborne mobility. What was achieved without such capability is remarkable, a tribute to the outstanding pilots of Army Aviation. The Taliban did not expect the Army to move so swiftly from different directions and with such determination, particularly against dominating heights where they were well dug in. To limit collateral damage in the towns, the Army took the calculated risk that the Taliban would leave their fortified positions in built-up areas and come and attack them. This was a fatal miscalculation, rather wishful thinking, compounded by the fact that road exits and mountain passes were not all blocked, possibly due to paucity of human and equipment resources. That is where a shortage of helicopters was critical, but it does not seem to have been militarily appreciated. This permitted a large number of Taliban to melt away, mostly in pickup trucks, with time and vehicular capacity to even take away their generators.

It is of vital importance when going after insurgents to target their leadership, locating and eliminating leaders like Fazlullah and Shah Doran. The inability to eliminate their top leadership is most probably due to inadequate intelligence rather than intent. With the Army’s presence in some strength giving the locals confidence, optimum use must be made of information gleaned from all sources. Unless the hardcore Taliban are eliminated they will always have the capacity and potential to come back in strength.

People with credibility and capability are needed to reach a sound assessment. Two outstanding veterans of different vintage with a track record of being blunt helped answer my queries. Both readily admitted that the Taliban were far better trained, equipped and motivated than the opponents they faced during their period. Capt (later Brig) Manto was the SSG company commander in the Dir operations in 1958. He took over Maj Ziauddin Abbasi Shaheed’s Bravo Squadron (Sept 11) in Guides Cavalry during war and commanded 26 Cavalry in battle in Chamb in 1971. In 1976 as CO 36 Baloch Lt Col (later Lt Gen) Lehrasab, who entered occupied Kashmir as part of Operation Gibraltar in 1965 as a lieutenant and was wounded grievously, being the last to be medically evacuated from East Pakistan in 1971, took the surrender of tribals in Dir. 

A well planned operation is falling short because of shortage of adequate intelligence and heliborne resources. We should brace ourselves for long-drawn guerrilla warfare that could tie the Army down while eating away the moral and material resources of the country. For a third opinion (and I deliberately did not turn to another genuine hero, my old CO Brig Mohammad Taj, SJ and Bar, for reasons that could have been embarrassing to the ISI), but someone who (like his course-mate Lehrasab) has shed blood for this country, his rifle company being almost wiped out, refusing to surrender when completely surrounded in East Pakistan in December 1971. Grievously wounded, Maj (later Brig) Akram woke up days later in captivity in an Indian Army Hospital. Nobody could recognise this hero’s emaciated self when he walked out of captivity in 1973. Presently helping in relief operations deep inside Malakand, Brig (Retd) Akram sent me an SMS that about sums it all up. “Our security agencies are still doing a lousy job. They virtually have no information on extremists’ leadership. Operations going very slow, lack of aggressiveness and absence of coordination is visible. Contents of daily sitrep (situation reports) as if fighting (is) taking place between two regular forces. More when we meet!” 

Instead of turning to the motivated with a gift of the gab, Kayani could take counsel from the likes of Manto, Lehrasab and Akram, and many others like him who have really fought (and not just talked the good talk) for this country, even shed blood for it. Their experience and sacrifice may give you that cutting edge in a fight that we must win. And maybe spare a thought for those fathers whose sons have already given the ultimate sacrifice for their country as was their wont and earnest desire. Only superior generalship and true rendition of the cause, not pandering subservience to the Constitution as it stands today, a controversial document mutilated by the black NRO, will make their supreme sacrifice worth the blood they have spilt for this nation.

Military operation and the fallout in Lower Dir

Originally under the control of the Nawab of Dir the area has been divided, subdivided and seen battles for ownership by local groups. The latest battle is one that the state of Pakistan must solely take responsibility for. A decades-long blundering and short-sighted policy has finally taken its toll. Now tanks and troops roll in to rectify the damage. Not an easy undertaking. Hundreds of thousands of the population is displaced, foreign insurgents freely hound our places and people are striking unholy alliances. The weakened state, rather a collaborating state is now attempting to make amends. It’s a tough task. But one that cannot be ignored.

The strategic significance of Lower Dir is illustrated by the fact that on its west lies Afghanistan, on its south is Malakand and Bajaur, in its north is Chitral and on its east lies Swat. Of Lower Dir’s approximately 130,000 population essentially 79 percent have left for safer places.

The local forces essentially consist of the Frontier Corps, known as Dir Scouts in the area. The Taliban have mounted offensive attacks gradually since end- March. Tensions have now spread to Upper Dir has well. The military commander maintain there is peace in five of the seven Lower Dir tehsils but what is seem while driving towards Maidaan,Chakdara and Gulabad signs of peace and security are not visible.

By mid-March violence raged in the area. The dates were of significance. None other than the local Frontier Corps commanders correlated the signing of first the February agreement between the NWFP government and the TNSM and the Nizam-e-Adl in April.

This reassertion of the Taliban was helped by the movements in the neighbouring Mohmand Agency’s Mohmaghat post. Mohmand provides the basic linkage between Bajaur, Dir and Waziristan. The significance of Bajaur is relevant for Lower Dir as well. With Kandharo, the place where the Taliban had their base where there had training camps and force concentration, has road access to Lower Dir.

It was in Kandharo that the Taliban declared the existence of an alternate Lal Masjid. Soon after the Lal Masjid operation was conducted the local Taliban set up a “Lal Masjid” in a mosque adjacent to the Hajisahib Tarangazis shrine. It is this mosque which the Taliban turned into their base. On a huge wall there are names of the Taliban who were killed during the operation. Kandharo, hence, is the hub from where Taliban are supplied to other surrounding areas, including Lower Dir.

The state has hitherto not been able to prevent the movement of inter-agency Taliban. Indeed, a tall order! What however is important is that the government must stop the easy movement of foreign militants from Kunar and Nagharhar in Afghanistan to the Suran Valley and beyond.

Buoyed by their foreign support, for example in Lower Dir, about 10 school kids were killed in a suicide bombing attack. Following that about 10 major blasts took place, killing dozens of locals. An estimated 80 people died. A local commercial bank manager was kidnapped and later killed. Similarly a DCO was also killed in early April. The kidnappers demanded a Rs20-million ransom. Finally they killed him. A similar fate awaited a local tehsildar. The hitherto banned FM radio station became active. Regular Taliban intercepts picked up indicated influx of foreign Taliban using the Kunar Valley-Suran Valley routes near Momandghat post bordering Bajaur and the Mohmand Agency.

Finally the government and the GHQ agreed to launch an operation between the night of April 25-26, with the Dir Scouts using two army units and an armoured unit. An about 2,000-strong force, including logistical support, was launched. Maidan aread was attacked. The significance of Maidan lies in its being the hub of Sufi Mohammad, the TNSM chief. The famous Qambar Bazaar passes through this stronghold–essentially Sufi Mohammad’s residential area. Sufi Mohmamad’s following has naturally been the strongest here. Above the Qambar Bazaar lies a strategically important post, the Kalapani post.

Kalapani lies at a height, just the perfect vantage point from where to hit the enemy from a height. Linked to Kalapani is a matted road which comes onto Qambar Bazaar, giving access to those who control the Kalapnai post. Two other important posts that fall in the Maidan area are the Lala Qila and the Qambar posts.

According to the army’s own estimates they are a fighting a force of no more than 500 to 600 Taliban. However, in the fishbowl battlefield of Maidan the strategic heights count. All Bajaur commanders repeatedly indicate that numerical superiority does not matter in the counter-insurgency battles fought in the mountainous terrain. The battle is treacherous. The IEDs are vastly spread. The locals can be on either side. Along the Timergarah-Maidan Road there are no guaranteed safe paths. In a quarter kilometre distance the media was taken by the army surrounded by hundred armed men, a tank ahead of us and dozens of troops perched on the jeep in which we sat. This is no safety zone in which civilians will return.

The Taliban too manage to go on the offensive. For example recently in Hayat Sarai the Taliban laid an ambush was a major surprise attack by the Taliban. Taliban had RPGs and mines and gave the army a tough fight.

It’s a tough task all around. The occasional civilians seen on the roads wear the look of fear. Initially they worked with locals worked with an approach to co-existence with the Taliban initially. They asked them to say their prayers in the mosque, they offered to provide them protection, to pray for Allah’s blessings. But subsequently they demanded that these people make financial contributions and also contribution. There is an appreciation that the operation may have brought destruction but there is hope that it may bring peace and security in the region.

Irrespective of what news may trickle out from either the Taliban or the army the fact is that the battle for Kalpani post and the control of the Qambar-Timergarah road still rages. Indeed reports suggest that the battle will be over soon. It is unlikely that a definitive answer is in the offing.

The counterinsurgency strategy is a tough one to implement.

The endgame target: a weak nuclear defanged Pakistan

First, a brief comment on the Obama address, since much has already been written about it. Certainly, for a US president, the address was a major shift in approach but it was sad to see how he referred to the 3,000 plus innocent victims of 9/11, but not a word about the well over one million Muslim deaths as a result of the Bush-launched retaliatory war stretching from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nor was Obama willing to concede that the 9/11 attackers were Saudis and not from this part of the world. It was also sad to see rhetoric accepting that force would not resolve Pakistan’s problems but the reality of continuing use of force through drones. 

The one major positive substantive policy shift – beyond mere rhetoric – was the reaching out to Iran for talks without preconditions. This should be an eye-opener for the servile past and present leadership of this nation – Iran stood by its nationalist posture and brought the US to where it wanted: a dialogue amongst two sovereign powers. On the Middle East one has to wait and see what actually happens on the ground since Obama also seemed unwilling to accept the electoral success of Hamas – which led him to state the bizarre claim that Hamas has “some support amongst the Palestinians!” 

But there is little positive for Pakistan that one can expect from the US even under Obama. But then when we have a continuing compliant leadership willing to do all that the US bids, why should Obama adopt a healthier and more positive approach to Pakistan? The sight of the president and a mere ambassador, Holbrooke, standing side by side at a press conference really said it all. International beggars and grovellers – our leaders have stripped us of all national dignity. The cowardice of our leadership was exposed by Holbrooke when he revealed that the Pakistani leadership had not taken up the drone issue with the US leadership at all. It is in this context, that many of us are concerned over the chief justice’s meeting with Holbrooke – now held on what can only be termed as terrible advice from the Foreign Office. Was it a deliberate ploy by the government to adversely impact the public perception of the chief justice? Was it simply coincidental that this meeting was advised by the government when the chief justice had made a reference to the NRO?

Meanwhile, with an unabated spread of violence across the country, and the renewed negative focus on our nuclear assets, we need to continue to connect the dots and realise the serious targeting of these assets and of those who will in the final analysis ensure their safety. Coincidences are becoming the hallmark of so many developments across the national spectrum, that there is also a need to see whether there is a deliberateness involved or are the timings truly coincidental. For instance, is it a mere coincidence that the ethnic battle is going on unabated in Karachi just when the nation is focused on the now-widening military action from Swat to FATA? Is this part of the overall plan to keep all parts of the country ignited so that the instability paradigm being plugged by the US and our other foreign detractors continues to sound credible and prepares the ground for taking control of our nuclear assets? 

As for the military operation, it is becoming ever more evident that this may be open-ended since there is still no overarching political strategy for the post-military scenario. One sees no effort to build the civil capacity for taking over from the military. It appears as if the civil government has simply handed over all responsibility to the military and has gone into a state of mental paralysis instead of ensuring that local governance and security capacity is created within the civil administration. 

Is it a mere coincidence that our military is being propelled into endless operations within the country at a time when India has begun a campaign against the Pakistan army? According to a Times of India report (May 16), Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has told Obama that some of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are already in ‘radical’ hands! Reaching out to anti-nuclear lobbies in countries like Japan, Indian analysts like Brahma Chellaney (closely linked to the Indian establishment) have begun a campaign declaring that it is Pakistan’s ‘military insiders’ who are a threat to the country’s nuclear assets. Probably basing his erroneous assumption on the fact that the Indian military has become increasingly Hindutva-oriented, he asserts that the Pakistan army has been infiltrated by a jihadist culture and both “Islamists (Jehadi, Islam, Islamists – all these terms are randomly used interchangeably by Chellaney) and US-sponsored generals” are labelled as threats to international peace and security. This theme is played out to its ridiculous conclusion that the US must take over Pakistan’s nukes!

Chellaney is just one of a handful of Indian and US analysts who periodically revive the campaign against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The leader of the pack is David Albright whose histrionics against Pakistan have become so absurd that Peter Lee, a businessman who has been writing on Asian affairs for over thirty years, felt compelled to write an article entitled, “The world does not have a Pakistan nukes problem — it has a David Albright problem” – the title says it all. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter not only exposed Albright’s claims to being a UN weapons inspector in an article “The nuclear expert who never was”, he also pointed out that “Albright has a track record of making half-baked analyses derived from questionable sources seem mainstream. He breathes false legitimacy into these factually-challenged stories by cloaking himself in a resume that is disingenuous.” Incidentally it was Scott Ritter who also wrote that Holbrooke was the wrong man for the job when Holbrooke was appointed as special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan and many of his arguments are now becoming more evident. 

While one expects external detractors to play the anti-Pakistan nuke game, is it a mere coincidence that some of our local papers have suddenly become full of locally written articles full of forebodings regarding our nukes? Is it a mere coincidence that one of the leading native critics of our nuclear weapons, a physicist, has simultaneously appeared in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists alongside physicist Albright for some years now? There is a two-pronged strategy that is now becoming obvious in relation to Pakistan’s nukes: externally the drummed-up scare over our command and control – despite the fact that it is the US that has revealed the disarray of its own command and control – and internally using local critics of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to sow doubts regarding the relevancy of atomic weapons (although if this was the case why the US is pursuing a programme for mini-nukes, etc) and to create a falsehood that such a capability is a liability for Pakistan. 

Why is there such renewed attention on our nukes? It would appear that we have moved beyond India in certain critical developments. We already had the uranium enrichment advantage (India’s was a plutonium-based weapon); now we have managed the plutonium-based skills also. Our delivery systems have moved from trial tests to training tests, and second strike capability is on the horizon also.

No wonder our foreign detractors are desperate to gain access at all costs. A new, third prong has been added to their strategy – the floating of trial balloons of offers of civil nuclear assistance kept deliberately vague to see how much access can be gained through non-US sources that may have more credibility in the country. The talk of French nuclear assistance is part of this game – we had begun to reach out to France during the India-US nuclear deal negotiations; now Sarkozy, a close ally of the US, has moved on this front and there is a deliberate ambivalence that is still being maintained. A story was also leaked of a US offer of civil nuclear assistance – but insiders have denied this. 

This is a dangerous game that is being played with Pakistan. Of course, if our leaders had the gumption, they would insist that our new impending safeguards agreements with the IAEA should only be on the Indian model. Our leaders should ask France and the US to support us in our move to demand that the IAEA give us the same country-specific safeguards agreement given to India for civilian facilities. Otherwise, all offers on nuclear cooperation are suspect and should be refuted – but that requires a major shift in our rulers’ prevailing subservient mind set.

The year when it all began

President Barack Hussein Obama’s much-anticipated speech at Cairo University was without precedent. His narration encompassed the sweep of Islamic history in a way that no sitting president of the United States had achieved before.

 

The speech will continue to be analysed from all angles in the weeks to come. One thing is clear. His vision of peace and cooperation between the Muslim world and the West will be welcomed by all but the most hardened anti-Americans in the Muslim world and the most hardened Islamophobes in the West.

 

Obama said that he was seeking a ‘new beginning’ between the US and the Muslim world based on ‘mutual interest and mutual respect’. He said that America and Islam were not mutually exclusive. Indeed, while travelling to Egypt, he told a German reporter that the US was one of the world’s largest Muslim countries.

 

In Cairo, he said America and the Muslim world shared common principles of justice, progress and tolerance and, most importantly, they conferred dignity on all human beings.

The speech was remarkable for what it contained and equally remarkable for what it did not contain. Obama did not apologise for American policy in the Middle East, as many in the region had hoped he would. Neither did he hurl invective at Muslims or their faith, as some non-Muslims would have liked. In recognising the current tensions between the US and the Muslim world, he conceded that the Cold War and the decades of colonial rule that preceded it had fuelled tensions. But he pointed squarely at violent Muslim extremists for making the ties worse.

 

The people who had carried out the attacks of 9/11 were continuing on a global rampage, attacking civilians regardless of faith to further their agenda. He said these extremists did not represent either the Muslim world or the religion of Islam. In so doing, he echoed what many Muslims throughout the world have been saying. Unfortunately, many religious leaders in Muslim countries have not been saying it loudly enough. They continue to blame America for all their problems.

 

This will not do. It has to change. The ulema have to come out and condemn terrorism in all its forms. And the political leaders in the Muslim world need to sow the seeds of tolerance both within their own societies and where other societies are concerned. Obama put it very well when he said: ‘So long as our relationship is defined by our differences, we will empower those who sow hatred rather peace.’

 

What Obama did not go into, perhaps given the impolitic conversations that it might engender, was how the US and the Muslim world had arrived at the current impasse. Much of the current tension dates back to events that took place 30 years ago. As the year 1979 dawned, the UN declared it the International Year of the Child. It would prove to be a prophetic title but not in the way that it was intended. It would spawn geopolitical problems that would linger on for decades.

In January, the Shah fled from the land where he had ruled as the ‘king of kings’. The Shah had been America’s boy in the Middle East. He was known to flip through the pages of Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine, shopping for arms like it was the Sears catalogue. He was expected to guard the oil resources of the region once Britain closed its East-of-Suez bases.

 

In February, Ayatollah Khomeini ended his exile in France and landed in Tehran. In April, Iran was declared an Islamic republic. In November, staffers at the American embassy were taken hostage. The war against the Great Satan, which had installed the Shah by deposing an elected civilian ruler in the 1950s, had begun.

 

Meanwhile, in neighbouring Iraq, Saddam Hussein took over as president. He portrayed himself as a secular alternative to the emerging theocracy in Iran. The West bankrolled him in his eight-year war with Iran which killed some 1.5 million people on both sides and left Iraq with a mountain of debt. When Kuwait called on him to repay the debt, he annexed that country as Iraq’s 19th province, precipitating the Gulf War.

 

That war led to a sizable American presence in Saudi Arabia and gave credence to Osama bin Laden’s cause in ways that were not anticipated by Washington. Al Qaeda would not be what it is today without that blunder. In April 1979, the military government of Gen Zia in Pakistan executed the deposed prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, making the military ruler a pariah in the West. On Christmas Eve, Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan placing Kabul under the iron hand of the Red Army.

 

Zia played up the Soviet threat by recalling the dreams of the czars to have a warm water port. The West now made him its saviour, granting him billions in military and economic aid. This myopic act by a Republican administration in Washington conferred legitimacy and longevity on what would otherwise have become a discredited regime.

 

Democracy was placed on the backburner. Once the Soviets pulled out, the Mujahideen broke out into a civil war which would lead to the birth of the Taliban in the mid-1990s. Pakistan’s intelligence agencies served as the mid-wife for a new regional order based on a deadly cocktail of narcotics, Kalashnikovs and religion.

 

In the years to come, the Taliban, in conjunction with Al Qaeda, would engage in suicide bombings aimed at innocent civilians, beheadings of Muslims and non-Muslims alike and the enslavement of Muslim women. In November 1979, in a sign that politically disenfranchised movements were breaking through the surface, the Grand Mosque in Makkah was taken over by extremists. The Saudi royals did not pay heed to the simmering revolt by reforming their society and would pay for it in the decades to come.

 

As he embarks on a journey that has the potential to transform ties between America and the Muslim world, President Obama will be attacked from all sides by people who seek a clash between civilisations. Attacks from the neoconservatives have already begun pouring in. That is why it is essential to view current events through the lens of history. There is no better way to shed light on what happened and why it happened and to derive insights about what needs to be done in the future to prevent a repeat.

Turning a new page?

In his much heralded address to the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims, President Barak Obama made a compelling case for a new beginning in long strained relations between the west and the Islamic world. In a masterly tour de force, cast in language seldom used by his predecessors, President Obama’s speech hit many of the right notes and set a welcome tone of respect in an effort to redefine the relationship.

Cynics cast the speech as little more than a public relations exercise that “repackaged” unchanged US policies. While the speech may not have broken new policy ground and was purposively short on specifics, this rejectionist view minimizes the import of President Obama’s effort at a rapprochement with the Muslim world and the possibilities this opens up.

President Obama himself acknowledged that one speech could not wipe away years of mistrust. But the vision he set out of charting a cooperative course on shared challenges marks a sharp departure from the with-us-or against-us paradigm of his predecessor. In seeking to build coalitions of consent, the president is also adapting to a globalized and interdependent world in which US power has been diminishing.

The Cairo speech marked President Obama’s latest and most significant outreach to the Muslim world. After his inaugural address in which he called for a new way forward based on “mutual respect and mutual interests”, he pressed this theme in an interview to the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya TV network, a videotaped message to the Iranian people on Nauroze, and his speech to the Turkish Parliament.

These public diplomacy initiatives, capped by the Cairo address, have several interrelated objectives, which include: a) to repair the image and standing of the US among Muslims that was especially battered during the Bush years; b) to create the atmosphere and space to restart the Middle East peace process; c) engage vigorously in the battle of ideas to drain support in the Muslim world for violent extremism; and d) to challenge Muslim communities to rethink some of their positions on issues ranging from religious freedom to Israel. 

These objectives also reflect a national security imperative for the US: to defuse and neutralize the threat from violent extremism and reverse the rising tide of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world which feeds extremism.

That President Obama refrained from using the word terrorism in his speech represented an effort to break from the overarching template of US engagement with the Islamic world in the post 9/11 years. This aims at signalling that Washington’s ties with Muslim countries will not be defined by this single prism even though, as President Obama declared in his speech, the US would “relentlessly confront violent extremists who pose a grave threat” to its security. And he reiterated what he told the Turkish Parliament: that America is not and never will be, “at war with Islam”.

He listed seven issue areas which the US and the Muslim world had to confront jointly: violent extremism, the Arab-Israeli dispute, the nuclear issue and Iran, democracy, religious freedom, women’s rights and economic opportunity.

The Cairo speech represents the most forthright public appraisal ever undertaken by a Western leader of the reasons why relations between the US and the Muslim world have plummeted to their lowest ever point – a fact attested to by opinion polls conducted over the years. In his review of this troubled legacy, he mentioned colonialism, the proxy relationships of the cold war era, the wars of “choice” and “necessity” in Iraq and Afghanistan, the measures America took after 9/11 which were “contrary to its ideals” (Guantanamo), Palestine and the tensions generated by modernity and globalization.

In weaving into his speech a nuanced recognition of Muslim grievances President Obama demonstrated both a grasp of history and an ability to understand the Muslim narrative.

Disappointingly the speech did not show similar understanding and empathy for South and South West Asia. The history review made no mention of the US contribution – albeit unwitting – to the toxic mix of problems bequeathed to the region by the long campaign waged against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Acknowledgement of the US role in waging this war of unintended consequences would have helped to remove the burden of history and signal to people in Pakistan that Washington was willing to accept its share of responsibility for the turmoil in the region. 

The one-speech-cannot-address-everything argument doesn’t hold ground on this count because explaining how and why violent extremism came to afflict this region is much too important to have been ignored in an address that tried to be fair to history.

The speech was also silent on Kashmir. An opportunity to win hearts and minds in Pakistan – the world’s second largest Muslim nation – was missed by this omission. Calling for a peaceful settlement of a dispute that has locked South Asia in a cycle of conflict and mistrust and fed into the longstanding Muslim perception that US policy is not in favour of equitable solutions to Muslim issues, would have cost him little.

Mention of the issue would have been consistent with Obama’s own assertions before his election that a Kashmir solution was essential for regional peace. And it would have raised his moral stature among Pakistanis and Kashmiris at a time of renewed turmoil in the Valley.

The centrepiece of his speech was the Palestinian–Israeli dispute, the issue that galvanizes Muslims everywhere and that has long come to symbolize their sense of historical grievance and injustice. Decades of uneven-handed policies that placed the security of Israel above any concern for justice for the Palestinian people and international law, alienated Muslims from the west. It is here that President Obama departed decisively from the past in signalling his determination to promote a settlement in as even-handed a manner as can be expected from an American President.

Although he did not lay out a detailed plan for Middle East peace, he set out the parameters for one. In his tone and language – including “occupation” and “daily humiliations” of the Palestinian people – he went further than any previous American President in aligning with the Muslim narrative. While describing his country’s bond with Israel as “unbreakable”, he delivered the sharpest public rebuke ever to Tel Aviv for its policy of settlements on the occupied West Bank. 

Whether or not this marks an end to Washington’s unqualified support for Israel, it does pitch the US as a neutral broker for the first time. By endorsing a two-state solution, President Obama sought to lay the ground to launch a vigorous round of diplomacy.

The litmus test of his promised change in relations with the Muslim world will be his ability to press Israel to accept a two-state solution consistent with the 2002 Saudi-framed Arab Peace Initiative. In coming months President Obama can be expected to engage in a battle of wills with the hard line Israeli leadership at a time when opinion polls in Israel show that the majority of people support a freeze on settlements.

The speech dealt with Afghanistan and Pakistan in a rather sketchy way. Whether or not this was a function of an address directed more to the Arab heartland than beyond, the impression it conveyed was of the lack of a strategic framework for Afghanistan. 

While President Obama justified the 2001 military intervention in Afghanistan as a war of necessity, he rationalized the continued deployment of American troops there as aimed at preventing “violent extremists from killing Americans”. Until the US is assured of its security its commitment to stay in Afghanistan “will not weaken”, despite the costs. But he held out the assurance that the US did not seek a permanent military presence in that country, which will be welcomed in Pakistan and beyond.

President Obama reiterated that military power alone was not the answer to problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the strategy he has rolled out so far remains at odds with this, placing too much reliance on military escalation, as signified by the troop surge in Afghanistan and intensified Drone attacks in Pakistan.

President Obama’s eloquent call to “re-imagine” the world in which the US and the Muslim world partner to confront common challenges on the basis of shared values holds much promise. Whether his speech will turn a new page in a turbulent relationship will depend on what concrete policy actions will follow. It will also depend on how Muslim leaders take up the political and intellectual challenge and engage the US to chart a new and hopeful course.

Swat operation and the fall beyond

Though the armed forces are carrying out operations against Taliban primarily in Swat, Buner and Lower Dir, the fallout of the action in neighbouring districts and beyond should remain a matter of concern. Dislocated from their bases and scattered as a result of the army assault, the militants are finding sanctuaries in new places and striking in areas outside their traditional strongholds. 

This reminds one of Afghanistan in the pre- and post-9/11 period. Prior to the US invasion of the country in October 2001, Al Qaeda was headquartered in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Following the fall of Taliban regime, Osama bin Laden and his men lost most of their sanctuaries in Afghanistan and had to relocate elsewhere. Most came to neighbouring Pakistan, from where some of them embarked on a risky journey to their native countries or to new trouble-spots such as Iraq. The majority stayed put in the region, mostly in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and became a threat to the governments in Kabul and Islamabad by making and strengthening alliance with like-minded militant groups in the two countries. Rather than being contained, Al Qaeda and the Taliban spread their influence beyond borders and become an even bigger threat to the established order than they were when well-entrenched in Afghanistan during the 1994-2001 period. It also became difficult to apprehend them as they were no longer confined to one place and country. 

Upper Dir, which became a separate district when Dir was split into two some years ago, is part of Malakand division but it wasn’t supposed to be an active front in the ongoing military operations. But it is fast becoming one due to Taliban activities in the remote Dhog Darra area. The security forces have already bombed the few villages where the Afghan Taliban got refuge and built sanctuaries. Troops also moved artillery batteries to the Khal area to fire at Taliban hideouts in the adjoining Swat valley. Gradually, Upper Dir was getting engulfed in the military action. However, the situation deteriorated following the recent suicide bombing in a mosque during Friday prayers at the Hayagai Sharqi village. The death of 50 villagers, including children, in the attack could have provoked anyone to take revenge. And that is what the aggrieved villagers and their allies are now doing, raising a lashkar, or armed volunteer force, and storming the three pro-Taliban villages – Shatkas, Ghazigay and Salambekay -, because they are convinced the suicide bomber came from there. After months of social boycott of these villagers and clashes, the majority anti-Taliban villages are now bent upon settling scores with the enemy. 

For obvious reasons, the government is taking no step to stop the fighting. Instead, it seems to be encouraging or could even be supporting the lashkar to go for the kill. This is the kind of battle that is fuelled by new blood-feuds and is never-ending until one side is vanquished and forced to accept the terms of surrender. Heavily-armed villages and clans hostile to each other cannot co-exist in peace, more so if they are supported and supplied by the government or militant groups such as Taliban. In the past also, the government has backed similar anti-Taliban lashkars in Swat, Buner, Bajaur, Orakzai, Darra Adamkhel and other places. Such a policy has generally caused lot of bloodshed and sowed the seeds of turmoil. The Taliban have ruthlessly retaliated by sending suicide bombers to attack jirgas of tribal elders and clerics hostile to them in Darra Adamkhel, Bajaur and Orakzai or causing harm to anyone in sight and terrorizing entire villages as was the case in Shalbandai in Buner, Hayagai Sharqi in Upper Dir and Mandaldag in Swat where the late anti-Taliban commander Pir Samiullah had dared to raise a lashkar against them. 

The Shangla district, lacking a strong civil administration and police, had always been vulnerable to incursions by the militants. However, it never had a strong Taliban presence. Even now most of the Taliban fighters gathered in its Puran and Chakesar areas came from Swat and Buner or crossed over from the mountainous Kala Dhaka, or Torghar area, in Mansehra district. Shangla residents are now suffering and getting displaced due to the Taliban’s decision to set up roadside checkpoints or use the district as a hideout for its retreating cadres. If pushed further, they would cross over to Kala Dhaka and Battagram, where the militants have recently carried out attacks against the police and exploded bombs. Other parts of Mansehra district including Shinkiari and Oghi too have experienced terrorist strikes as part of the fallout of the situation in Swat, Buner and Shangla. Kohistan, another district of Hazara, could meet the same fate as a few hundred Kohistani militants operating in Swat’s Kalam and Bahrain tehsils have reportedly returned home to escape an onslaught by the security forces. They may not sit idle for long and some of them could become active upon receiving instructions from their commanders, who presently are in disarray. 

Though Malakand Agency is part of Malakand division, it didn’t fall into the category of the Taliban-infested Swat, Buner and Lower Dir districts where active military operations were planned. However, the militants have struck a few times in Malakand Agency, where the poorly-armed and trained Malakand Levies were deployed until now to provide a semblance of security to the people. The main road to Swat and rest of Malakand division passes through the Malakand Agency and curfew has to be frequently imposed to protect military convoys using the Mardan-Malakand-Chakdarra-Mingora road. The militants are finding it tempting to attack the army convoys using this busy road. Though there is controversy regarding the recent incident in Sakhakot, a town in Malakand Agency, in which the army says the detained TNSM leaders Maulana Mohammad Alam and Amir Izzat Khan were killed along with a soldier in an attack by the militants, it nevertheless showed the vulnerability of the troops to such attacks on this critical route. By the way, the government would have to do a lot more to clear the doubts regarding the killing of the two TNSM leaders, who were in custody of the security forces and hadn’t been charged for any crime. The uncertainty about the whereabouts of the TNSM head Maulana Sufi Mohammad also needs to be cleared because the death and detention of Islamic leaders waging peaceful struggle for Shariah could complicate matters and push their followers to join forces with the Taliban. 

More worrying are the Taliban incursions into districts outside Malakand division. Mardan is the prime target for the Taliban due to its proximity to both Buner and Swat. As host of the biggest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) both in and outside the camps, it has received its share of disguised militants waiting for an opportunity to strike back at the security forces and law-enforcement agencies. The recent attack, which employed the classic guerilla tactic of planting and exploding an improvised explosives device (IED) to target a military convoy and then ambushing the troops and police sent as reinforcements, on the Rustam-Buner road showed how crucial has Mardan district become in tackling the militants and stabilizing Buner as well as Swat. Up to 10 soldiers and cops were killed in this attack, which explained how quickly the Swati and Buneri Taliban using local militants adapted themselves to the changed circumstances and planned and executed a deadly strike. 

Similar attacks could take place in Swabi, Charsadda, Nowshera and even Peshawar, all part of the vast and fertile Peshawar valley where the battle against militancy and extremism is gradually shifting and where its fate could be eventually decided. In fact, the Peshawar valley is also facing fallout of the military action in the tribal areas of Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai and Darra Adamkhel. It is here that the political elite of the province lives and where the big army garrisons, seat of the government and the commercial hubs are located. By destabilizing the vale of Peshawar, the militants would be hoping to paralyze the government and consolidate their hold in Waziristan and other tribal areas in the south and in Malakand division in the north of the province.

Swat Operation and Beyond

The aim of any counterinsurgency is to eliminate insurgents. While securing and holding territory is certainly a prime consideration, unless the insurgents are killed or captured, mainly their principal leaders, an insurgency has the capacity to build on itself. In Swat the Army has done a splendid job in quickly establishing its presence in almost the entire territory, and in killing a substantial number of insurgents. Despite its commendable sacrifices, particularly by the officers’ corps, it has fallen way short of its principal mission, eliminating the insurgent threat. In fact, one may even be anxious about the future. Enough insurgents have escaped to threaten a long-term guerrilla war. That leads us straight to the humanitarian question, are conditions now conducive to the return of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) be created?

Even though time was of the essence, it is clear that the consequences of the military action in Swat (and adjoining territories) was not well thought out, either in civilian or military circles. The inherent weakness of the civil administration, both at the federal and provincial line, to cater for the humanitarian crises was not anticipated. Not only intelligence but media reports had indicated that the militants were using terrain where heights give them physical domination of the area. Also, the military should have been in no doubt that the fighting would create a major civilian exodus. 

According to a military briefing at the highest level, the operation was conducted from four difficult directions. The concentric nature meant to occupy vital ground and force the militants to abandon their fortified positions in built-up areas, and come and fight the military on the ground of their choosing. This was brilliant, it worked because it spared tremendous collateral damage to the towns. However, it had a very fatal flaw. The militants believed in the classic guerrilla theory propounded by the Godless Mao Tsetung: “He who fights and runs away lives to fight another day.” By avoiding the elimination of their top leadership and a considerable portion of their cadres, the stage has been set for a classic guerrilla compaign. The initiative is therefore now passed into the hands of the Taliban despite the grievous losses inflicted upon them by the Army in field combat, the Army is now on the defensive and the guerrillas have the capacity for hit and run tactics on static posts and along the lines of communication. What have the Army learnt from the sorry experience of FATA? 

While the government has to be commended for immediately created the Strategic Support Group (SSG), and appointing a veteran from the Earthquake Relief and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) to lead it, what are the resources allocated to the SSG to cater to the catastrophe? Given that an Army Engineer Brigade is mending the rounds and relevant infrastructure of Swat, including electricity, water and sewage, it is quite likely that with increased guerrilla activity, the IDPs go back only partly—i.e., send back only able-bodied men to reclaim their hearths and home and livestock (or whatever is left of it) and leave most old people, women and children in the camps, as was the case in the Afghan refugee camps, in exist once now for nearly three decades later. While it is good news that permanent Army cantonments are planned in Swat, what is needed is far more dynamic military thinking that takes in air mobility as the prime instrument of countering military guerilla activity. Regretfully, the answer to a direct question about heliborne capacity was extremely disappointing.

Something is clearly deficient if any military commander cannot understand that enhanced air mobility is vital in any counter-insurgency, both during battle and afterwards. 

One must counter civilian guerilla activity by winning over the hearts and minds of the local population, in the present insecure circumstances that will be a hard sell. The prime mission must be to restore the civil administration as soon as possible. One is heartened by the fact that the Army has handed over the names of 4000 ex-servicemen locally from NWFP to be employed as policemen. This is a tremendous government indicative and must be commended. Why not go further and induct retired ex-servicemen from the NWFP in the civil administration on contract? They could be employed to fill the vacuum created for various reasons, but this decision is required immediately. While in theory the prime responsibility for dealing with the populace is that of politicians, these are special circumstances. We need to extend the mandate of the Special Support Group akin to that of a civilian administration working in tending with the military till full normalcy in administration is restored, we cannot afford to take chances.

If I remember correctly, the correct military teaching is that you do not win a war only by occupying territory. You win a war by eliminating the threat completely. A counterinsurgency is something like a fumigation of a building, equating bad governance to the cockroaches in the nooks and corners within the building. You have to block off all exits and prevent the cockroaches from exiting. While on the ground, the troops have performed above and beyond the call of duty in the tactical sense, in the strategic sense we may have created conditions that spell a disaster in the looming. 

We are in trouble. No, let me correct that, we are in deep trouble. Islamabad, we have a problem!

The unnecessary war!

Somehow, our history has gone astray. We were such good people when we set out on the road to Pakistan. What happened? 

Marx once said: “Neither a nation nor a woman is forgiven for an unguarded hour in which the first adventurer who comes along can sweep them off their feet and possess them”. October 7, 1958 was our unguarded hour when democracy was expunged from the politics of Pakistan, perhaps forever, with scarcely a protest. The result is the mess we are in today.

“Liberty once lost”, Adams famously told his countrymen, “is perhaps lost forever”. We Pakistanis lost our liberties and all our democratic institutions in October 1999. Sadly, Pakistan also lost her honour and became a ‘rentier state’ on General Musharraf’s watch when he capitulated, said yes to all the seven demands presented to him at gunpoint by Secretary Colin Powell and joined the “Coalition of the coerced”. Regrettably, this situation remains unchanged even though the country is now under a democratic dispensation!

A lesson to be drawn from the works of Gibbon is that Rome’s enemies lay not outside her borders but within her bosom, and they paved the way for the empire’s decline and fall – first to relentless barbarian invaders from the north, and then, a thousand years later, to the Turks. Many early symptoms that heralded the Roman decline may be seen in our own nation today: concentration of power in one person without responsibility and accountability, contempt for the constitution and political institutions, absence of the rule of law, high-level corruption and greed and last but not least, periodic military intervention in the affairs of state and prolonged military rule. When the history of Pakistan comes to be written, the verdict of history will almost certainly be that military rule, more than anything else, destroyed Pakistan. 

If you want to know what happens to a country when unbridled ambition of its rulers flourishes without proper restraint, when absolute power enables the ruler to run the country arbitrarily and idiosyncratically, when none of the obstacles that restrain and thwart democratic rulers stand in his way, when parliament is cowed, timid, a virtual paralytic, well: visit Pakistan. Today it is like a severely blinkered cart horse painfully pulling a heavy wagon on a preordained track to nowhere. 

All the philosophers tell the people they are the strongest, and that if they are sent to the slaughterhouse, it is because they have let themselves be led there. Authoritarianism is retreating everywhere except in Pakistan. Why? In other countries there are men and women who love liberty more than they fear persecution. Not in Pakistan. Here the elite who owe everything to this poor country do not think in terms of Pakistan and her honour but of their jobs, their business interests and their seats in a rubber-stamp parliament. Surrender rather than sacrifice is the theme of their thoughts and conversations. To such as these talk of resisting autocracy is as embarrassing as finding yourself in the wrong clothes at the wrong party, as tactless as a challenge to run to a legless man, as out of place as a bugle call in a mortuary. 

How can you have authentic democracy in a country where de facto sovereignty – highest power over citizens unrestricted by law – resides neither in parliament, nor the executive, nor the judiciary, nor even the constitution which has superiority over all the institutions it creates? It resides, if it resides anywhere at all, where the coercive power resides. It is the ‘puvois occult’ which decides when to abrogate the constitution, when to dismiss the elected government, when to go to war and when to restore sham democracy.

Are people anxious? Dejected? Fearful? Angry? Why wouldn’t they be, considering the daily barrage of rotten news assaulting them from every direction? We live in a country that is terribly wrong and politically off course. What is worse, it is no longer a sovereign or independent country. It is a lackey of the United States. When will this tormented country be whole again? When will this sad country be normal again? The engine is broken. Somebody has got to get under the hood and fix it. President Zardari is so swathed in his inner circle that he has completely lost touch with the people and wanders around among small knots of persons who agree with him. The country is in deep, deep trouble. An uncertain future leaves us stranded in an unhappy present with nothing to do but wait. Eventually, the cup of endurance runs over and the citizen cries out, “I can take it no longer”. A day will soon come when words will give way to deeds. History will not always be written with a pen. 

In the backdrop of this gloom and doom, President Zardari, under American pressure, unleashed the hounds of war, turning the beautiful valley of Swat into a vale of tears. As a result of army action, millions of innocent people, men, women and children, young and old, were uprooted, rendered homeless and forced to flee. Was army action unavoidable? Was it absolutely necessary? Did the people of Swat have to pay this terrible price? And what for? All these questions remain unanswered. 

“One day”, Churchill wrote, “President Roosevelt told me that he was asking publicly for suggestions about what World War II should be called. I said at once ‘the Unnecessary War’”. Today Pakistan is at war with itself. The country is tearing itself apart. Why? One thing is clear. There never was a more unnecessary war, a war more easy to stop, a war more easy to prevent, a war more difficult to justify and harder to win than that which has wrecked Swat. 

Let me state clearly that the war in Swat, like the war in FATA, is not our war. It’s a proxy war imposed on us by our corrupt rulers who owe everything to Washington. It is perceived in the Pakhtun belt as genocide, part of a sinister American plan for the mass extermination of Pakhtuns on both sides of the Durand Line. 

With temperature rising, living conditions in the camps and elsewhere, fast deteriorating, the army operation has morphed into a war that is hard to win and harder to justify to the people affected by it. One thing is clear. While the Pakistan army wields a large hammer, not every problem is a nail. The lesson of history is: never fight a proxy war, never deploy military means in pursuit of indeterminate ends and never use your army against your own people. 

No army, no matter how strong, has ever rescued a country from internal disorder, social upheaval and chaos. Army action can never quash the insurgency in Malakand division or FATA. It can only be managed until a political solution is found. No one can be bombed into moderation. This is a false and dangerous notion. The Taliban can be deterred militarily for a time but tanks, gunships and jet aircraft cannot defeat deeply felt belief. 

President Zardari is playing with fire and acting like Conrad’s puffing gunboat in Heart of Darkness, shelling indiscriminately at the opaque darkness. The enemy is nebulous and the battlefield is everywhere. He has no address and no flag, wears no uniform, stages no parades, marches to his own martial music. He requires no tanks or submarines or air force. He does not fear death. As the Soviets found in Afghanistan, the enemy doesn’t fight in conventional ways, but from behind big boulders and from concealments. He doesn’t have to win. He just has to keep fighting. Asymmetrical warfare is what they call it now.

The war’s end remains far out of sight but the battle for the hearts and minds of the people seems to have gone awry. If you want to know how the displaced persons feel, go to Mardan and listen to the wretched of the earth. You will hear the thrumming, the deadly drumbeat of burgeoning anger.