Heavy costs of a dirty war

THAT the world changed with the departure of Bush was borne out by Obama’s words at his inaugural address when he said, “Our founding fathers … drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man … those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience’s sake.”

This is what distinguishes the western civilisation from what the Taliban and Osama are selling: it underscores the supremacy of the rule of law, and its cornerstone, that everyone is innocent till proven guilty. It was a rejection of rendition, water-boarding and other euphemisms for the torture of prisoners, incarcerated for years without trial. It is not difficult to fathom why the US, and Britain under Blair, lost their moral leadership of the world.

British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, a gifted man by all accounts, and son of the well-respected scholar and academic Ralph Miliband, felt that the time had come to accept that the war on terror, as conducted since 9/11, had been self-defeating, and that “we must respond to terrorism by championing the rule of law and not subordinating it, for it is the cornerstone of the democratic society”.

He was articulating much the same vision as Obama, and like him mentioned the need to settle the Kashmir issue, “as that would deny extremists in the region one of their main calls to arms”. He was referring to one of the “contexts” of terrorism, as Arundhati Roy refers to it, and which must be addressed if a long-term end to terrorism is to be found.

Obama had stated the need to settle the Kashmir issue and take a regional approach to terrorism, and appoint an emissary for South Asia. However, caving in to Indian lobbying, he restricted Richard Holbrooke’s remit to Pakistan and Afghanistan, although India’s proactive role in Afghanistan is now well established. As for Miliband, despite visceral attacks on Miliband by the Indian government and media, his spokesman was quoted in the Independent as saying, “The foreign secretary was very open and honest about his views, which are those of the British government.”

The Indian government and media’s response to Miliband’s statement was in the same vein as that to the tragic Mumbai attacks — bellicose and jingoistic. The pulverisation of the financial centre of this aspiring world power for 60 hours by just 10 men brought into focus the deep fault lines in Indian society: the running sore of the Kashmir issue and the treatment of its minorities, of which the Sachar Report is a damning testament.Threatening war on Pakistan, knowing that its military was already stretched in the west in Fata and Swat, was a nightmare for Pakistan. But India showed a dangerous lack of restraint and responsibility by a nuclear power in demonstrating brinkmanship, sending its air force planes into Pakistan’s air space, and threatening pre-emptive strikes. It does not take great wisdom to conclude that an attempt to destabilise Pakistan would spread the fire of terrorism from Pakistan’s western borderlands all the way to India’s eastern frontier, where they are already embroiled in a long-standing insurgency.

Pakistan has paid a heavy price for the strategic blunders of the previous American administration in its conduct of the international war on terror. As Obama has argued consistently, going into Iraq took away from what should have been the main focus of the US, the war in Afghanistan. The half-hearted pursuit of its war aims in Afghanistan has caused the insurgency to spread to Pakistan, and strengthened the hold of the Taliban in Afghanistan. While the coalition forces have lost 1,000 soldiers, Pakistan has lost about 2,000 of its security forces in Fata and Swat, and 14,000 civilians. About 400,000 people have been displaced from Fata and another 500,000 from Swat. All made refugees in their own country.

And what does Pakistan get for fighting this dirty war? One billion dollars as replacement for the money spent in the war on terror by our military forces, and $60m in aid. Peanuts when compared to the $2bn per year given to Egypt and $3bn per year to Israel, while the Americans continue to drag their feet on the Biden-Lugar Bill.

With the prospect of being well-equipped and better paid than any Pakistani soldier or policeman, and funded by the opium grown in Afghanistan, now a source of 90 per cent of the world’s output, it is difficult for unemployed young men of our tribal areas and Afghanistan to resist this lucrative employment with the Taliban. The selling of the cause in religious terms has an added appeal for the young men, especially in Afghanistan, where 80 to 90 per cent are illiterate.

Asymmetric wars have shown the limitations of state military force. The use of air power and artillery on non-state actors has resulted in large civilian casualties, and provided a fertile recruiting ground to the extremists. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been protesting the cost of civilian casualties as a consequence of bombings by the coalition forces with little effect, and the same is happening with the attacks by drones in Fata. Having got a drubbing in Vietnam, barely managing to survive in Iraq, one would have expected the Americans to be more receptive to the arguments of their partners in the war on terror. Expectations that Obama would break from the imperial hubris of his predecessor seem to be misplaced.

The government of Pakistan must re-negotiate the terms with the Americans. The state of Pakistan is the biggest casualty of the incompetence and lack of commitment of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, as even at this point in time, the Europeans are reluctant to volunteer more troops or funding for the war.

The US and Afghanistan

PRESIDENT Barack Obama’s appointment of Richard Holbrooke as his special envoy on Pakistan and Afghanistan will make sense only if it is followed by a policy review that touches the core of the United States’ policy.

Holbrooke’s visit to the region next month will be a precursor to the review. During the election campaign Obama promised to send two additional brigades to Afghanistan (7,000 troops) to join their 34,000 compatriots. There are in all 200,000 foreign forces in the country.

If there is one single factor that governed the United States’ approach in three states in Asia where its policies have yielded a colossal failure at the end — Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran — it is its arrogant disavowal of diplomacy and reliance exclusively on the use of force.

Professions of friendship for the Muslim world are fine. The stark reality is that two Muslim countries were wantonly and brutally laid waste by the US-led invasion for ends that could have been achieved by diplomacy. An exceptionally informed report by James Risen of The New York Times in November 2003 cited Iraqi overtures to the US before the war, based on documents and interviews. Iraq offered to: (1) help in the peace process in Palestine; (2) grant “US oil concessions”; (3) consent that “Americans could send 2,000 FBI agents to look wherever they wanted” and (4) “hold elections within the next two years”.

The offer came “from the highest levels of the Iraqi government”. The CIA was in touch with the Iraqi intelligence service. Its chief of operations, Hassan al-Obeidi, spoke in a “begging” tone in early March. He as well as his director, Jalil Habbush al-Tikriti, were prepared to meet US representatives in Beirut. “Such a meeting has Saddam Hussein’s clearance.” The US was not interested. It invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003.

By April 2000 the Taliban chief Mullah Omar “wanted to get rid of Osama but did not know how”, Pakistan’s special envoy to Afghanistan (1996 to 2000) S. Iftikhar Murshed records in his memoirs, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years. Omar said he was in a bind and proposed a group of ulema from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and a third Islamic country to decide the issue. The Taliban would comply. The proposal was rejected by the Saudis and the Americans.

To these revealing memoirs add the reportage by David Ottaway and Joe Stephens of the Washington Post (Oct 29, 2001) and ‘The Taliban File’ put out by the National Security Archive at Washington DC on Sept 11, 2003 in its Electronic Briefing Book No. 97 containing 32 declassified official documents (1994 to 2001). What emerges is a picture of a feckless US which made not the slightest effort to understand the Taliban. They were begging of the US for recognition. In November 1997, on the steps of Pakistan’s Foreign Office, President Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called the Taliban “despicable” for their gender policies. Gender policies of others in the region received no such reproach.

Murshed writes: “The stabilisation of Afghanistan could have been achieved much earlier had the international community engaged with and not isolated the Taliban. …The 9/11 tragedy might not have happened and other acts of terrorist violence could have been averted. The opportunity was squandered.”

Arrogance cuts across party lines. As Zbigniew Brzezinski said, 9/11 was an act of terrorism, not aggression. The British security service MI5’s chief Stella Rimington said last October, that the US’ response was “a huge overreaction … it was another terrorist incident”, albeit on a horrible scale.

Do you blame the Taliban for insisting that the foreign forces withdraw? On Nov 17 Mullah Brother, their deputy leader, said that “as long as foreign occupiers remain in Afghanistan we are not ready for talks. …The problems in Afghanistan are because of them.”

Is Obama capable of looking into the abyss? That will be a test of his capacity for leadership. Else it will be Bush’s policies garnished with a special envoy. Only an awareness of the wrongs done can prompt a review worth the name. As Simon Jenkins put it, “Waging war in Afghanistan ranks with marching on Moscow in the canon of military folly…. It is obscene to justify this carnage by citing a few rebuilt Afghan schools and roads, as British ministers do. The country will never be at peace and Pakistan never safe until the West withdraws its troops — and probably not even then. We shall leave another nation in ruins.”

The war is unwinnable. The British ambassador in Kabul Sherard Cowper-Coles noted last October that Nato was not winning “The presence of the Coalition, in particular its military presence, is part of the problem, not part of the solution.” A few days later Brigadier Carleton-Smith UK’s C-in-C in Helmand, said “we are not going to win this war” and the idea of a political accord with the Taliban “shouldn’t make people uncomfortable”.

In a recent article in Foreign Affairs Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid advocate “a political settlement with current insurgents”. Leaders linked to the Taliban and others wanted to know the US’ war aims. “They claim to be willing to support an Afghan government that would guarantee that its territory would not be needed to launch terrorist attacks in the future — in return, they say for the withdrawal of foreign troops.” This can “constitute a framework for negotiations”.

A regional approach will help. That would require an understanding between the US and Iran and between India and Pakistan. Last month the former ISI chief Asad Durrani told an Indian journalist “There is no bigger threat to peace in the region than the foreign troops in Afghanistan. We are neighbours and are stuck with each other; others can come and go as they please. We have to approach this problem in a spirit of cooperation and mutual benefit.”

Replicating the Al Anbar model in FATA?

Al Anbar is a region in Iraq that was devastated by Al Qaeda inflicted violence. Several Sunni tribes of the region formed an alliance, supported by the US, and took up arms against the terrorists. The tribes successfully controlled Al Qaeda terrorism and stabilized the region. In media it was called ‘Al Anbar Awkening’.

All over the world think tanks studying the situation in FATA debate and discuss whether an Al Anbar style awakening is possible in FATA? Can FATA tribes take up arms against the Taliban and Al Qaeda? In my opinion there is tremendous potential for an Al Anbar style awakening in FATA. But there is one huge obstacle: the mistrust of the tribes in the military leadership, especially the intelligence agencies. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have been target killing tribal leaders and so far the military has failed to protect the latter. So far no one has even been officially accused or arrested of the target killing of more than 200 tribal leaders.

The target killing of the tribal leaders started in South Waziristan almost at the same time when the US was bombing Taliban and Al Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan in 2001 and the militants ran towards Waziristan. They were not welcomed by the tribal leaders. In order to have a strong foothold in Waziristan, the militants killed more than 120 tribal leaders. Clearly the then government of General Pervez Musharraf was playing a double game. On one hand it joined the US led war on terror, on the other hand it allowed the militants to kill the tribal leaders and replace the tribal order with the Taliban order.

Next the killing spree was taken to other tribal areas including Khyber, Orakzai and Bajaur agencies. There is a strong perception among many Pakhtun that this killing was carried out with tacit consent of the intelligence agencies of Pakistan to create full leadership space for Taliban in the Pakhtun tribal society. This is the key obstacle that is preventing the remaining tribal leaders and young people in FATA from taking up arms against the Taliban and Al Qaida.

Despite this there is still a strong potential in FATA tribal leaders and young people to challenge the terrorists. I conclude this from the surveys conducted by AIRRA, an independent think tank working on human security, regional cooperation and radicalization, previous events in the area and my personal discussions with young men and women of FATA: They pointed out that in tehsil Pranghar of Momand Agency, the people rose against the Taliban as soon as the Taliban first assaulted Momand Agency. Consequesntly, Tangi in district Charsadda is safe because of this event. Since 2004, we find sporadic uprisings against the Taliban but due to the inability of the Pakistani security forces, the leaders of Qaumi Lashkars (national laskars) were mostly target killed by the Taliban. If the elders and the youth of the Pakhtun belt are taken into confidence and assured that an anti-Taliban tribal army will not be marked for target killing, the uprising can succeed.

But for that to happen Pakistan army and the government of Pakistan have to take some confidence building measures to restore the faith of the tribes. I had discussions with some tribal men and women during my recent visit to Pakistan. They suggested the following as confidence building measures. One, some, if not all Taliban leaders must be target killed by Pakistan army. Two, all security forces must be issued a kill at sight order against the first and second layers of all Taliban and Al Qaida groups in Pakistan. Three, the government should announce head-money for killing or capturing any top, second or third level leaders of the Taliban. They also said that the Pakistan army must closely coordinate with the tribal armies made against the militants. They pointed out that the tribal armies had been fighting for days and Pakistan army, stationed near by never showed up to help the armies besieged by the Taliban till the armies were massacred by the Taliban, armed with much more sophisticated weapons than the tribesmen. They said the tribal leaders must stay in some kind of hot line communication with the top leadership of Pakistan army and government and in case of any Taliban attack, Pakistan army must send air borne commandos to help the tribal armies. They also said if necessary Pakistan air force must carpet bomb the Taliban and they are not averse to the ISI buying some suicide bombers in some kind of intelligence cover and sending them to bomb the Taliban leaders in meetings, just like they bombed the tribal jirgas in FATA.

I would request the government of Pakistan and the leadership of Pakistan army to engage in discussions with the tribal leaders to work out details to form tribal armies, to take on the Taliban. I would request fellow citizens all across Pakistan to morally support such tribal armies and build up pressure on Pakistan army to stand by the tribal armies until the Taliban are controlled and writ of the government restored. I would also request the international community to keep financial plans ready for prompt reconstruction and development of FATA after the elimination of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

And the drone policy continues…

The issue of missile strikes by US drones in Pakistan’s territory has dominated politics and the media in recent days and weeks. The new Obama administration has made it clear the attacks will continue despite statements of disapproval on an almost daily basis by Pakistani leaders, who argue that this policy was undermining Islamabad’s efforts to counter the militancy.

Robert Gates, who has been retained as defence secretary by President Barack Obama to ensure continuity to Washington’s policy in its ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, became the first American official last week to publicly comment on the issue of drone attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Normally, US officials avoid commenting on the topic in public and instead unnamed sources in the Pentagon or the intelligence agencies leak information to the American media about such attacks, along with the claim that someone important in Al Qaeda had been killed. At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr Gates said the US would continue to carry out missile attacks against Al Qaeda militants in Pakistan. The US, he warned, will “go after Al Qaeda wherever Al Qaeda is.” He also said the decision had been conveyed to the government of Pakistan.

The statement by the US defence secretary left no doubt that the installation of a new president wasn’t going to change Washington’s policy with regard to attacks by the CIA-operated drones in Pakistani territory. Rather, there is every possibility that such strikes will increase in both frequency and intensity, in view of Mr Obama’s pledge during his presidential election campaign that drone attacks in Pakistan would continue even without Islamabad’s approval if there was evidence about the presence of Al Qaeda members. In fact, two such missile strikes were carried out in a single day in North Waziristan and South Waziristan within the first three days of the installation of President Obama, and around 30 people, including women and children, were killed. As usual, the killings were justified by the Americans simply saying that Al Qaeda members were the real target. The implication was that everyone in the two Waziristans and other tribal areas could become a target if he or she happened to live or work near a place frequented by real or imaginary Al Qaeda operatives.

The issue of drone attacks was debated in the Senate where, after consulting the Foreign Office the leader of the House, the PPP’s Mian Raza Rabbani said the US had not conveyed in writing its decision to continue its drone attacks inside Pakistan. He also stated that no unilateral US decision was binding on Pakistan. Now, this is funny, because the US has been carrying out airstrikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas since 2003-2004 when it eliminated Pakistani Taliban commander Nek Mohammad and struck some other targets, and the continuation of that policy, despite the change of government in Islamabad or Washington, shouldn’t come as a surprise. Being the world’s only superpower, the US doesn’t feel the need to seek permission or convey its decisions in writing while dealing with unstable countries ruled by spineless leaders.

Pakistan abdicated its right to be taken seriously long ago when it first agreed to assist the US in fighting the Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan, hosting, training and arming the Afghan mujahideen, and then did an about-turn in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to enable America to occupy the same country. Both decisions were made primarily at the behest of the US to advance the American agenda without calculating the consequences that such a policy would have for Pakistan. Pakistani society was radicalised due to the fallout of this policy and the consequences are now in evidence all over the country.

It is meaningless to indulge in a debate on whether the US is simply informing Pakistan, as Mr Gates disclosed about its drone attacks, and that too after the strikes have been made, or there is some kind of understanding between the two countries on the issue. In either scenario, the US doesn’t want a negative answer. Conveying the information about the missile strikes to Pakistan is considered good enough and apparently non-negotiable. If the US hasn’t already secured an understanding from the Pakistani government about the necessity of carrying out the drone attacks to target Al Qaeda figures, it could possibly do so by offering some carrots or by wielding the stick. Having given itself the right to launch pre-emptive attacks anywhere in the world to prevent harm to the US, superpower America is confident that it cannot be made accountable for its actions in our lopsided world where might is always right. Using this right, the US has attacked and occupied countries and bombed faraway places. it has gone too far in its revenge after 9/11 and created for itself a lot more enemies than it previously had.

In terms of airstrikes, Pakistan has suffered more US attacks than Syria, Yemen and Somalia for the simple reason that its tribal areas have been marked as a safe haven for Al Qaeda militants. All these countries are Islamic, just like Iraq and Afghanistan that are under US occupation, and this is a major reason for Muslims to complain that they are the real target of the US-led Western war against terror. It is true that some Al Qaeda operatives have been killed in the drone attacks and others are still hiding in the tribal areas or elsewhere in Pakistan, but the civilian casualties far outnumber of Al Qaeda militants eliminated and the outcome has been a further increase in anti-US sentiment. Still, the US is convinced that its policy is working as the drone strikes are considered an effective tool to hit Al Qaeda-linked militants and deny them safe havens in the tribal borderland. There is no realisation that this policy is destabilising Pakistan and making it increasingly difficult for its weak and directionless PPP-led coalition government to continue cooperating with the US.

Also, the missile strikes in Pakistani territory don’t seem to have lessened the resolve of the Afghan Taliban or weakened their resistance against the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan. Instead, the resurgent Taliban have forced the US to send another 30,000 troops over and above the 75,000 foreign forces already in Afghanistan by opening new frontlines and spreading their presence to 72 percent of the Afghan territory as a recent report by a European think-tank observed. If the US and its allies with all their might and technology cannot defeat the largely resourceless and outnumbered Taliban in Afghanistan, where questions of sovereignty have long been put to rest, how is it possible for America to destroy Al Qaeda and its allied Taliban and jihadi groups through occasional drone attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas? Killing a few Al Qaeda operatives or Pakistani and Afghan militants once in a while may provide a sense of achievement to the US military but it cannot be part of a successful long-term policy to combat militancy and extremism. Militant groups such as Al Qaeda and Taliban have a remarkable capacity to replace fallen comrades and attract new recruits, more so since the cause has a religious dimension. The motivation is to liberate your homeland from foreigners and the enemy is America.

Drone strikes

YOU aren’t really the US president until you’ve ordered an air-strike on somebody, so Barack Obama is certainly president now: two in his first week in office. Obama must know that these remote-controlled drone strikes usually kill not just the “bad guy”, whoever he is, but also the entire family he has taken shelter with. It also annoys Pakistan, whose territory the United States violates in order to carry out the killings.

President Obama may be planning to shut Guantanamo, but the broader concept of a “war on terror” is still alive and well in Washington. Most of the people he has appointed to run his defence and foreign policies believe in it, and there is no sign that he himself questions it.

That generation of American officers learned from their miserable experience in Vietnam that going halfway around the world to fight a conventional military campaign against an ideology (communism then, Islamism now) was a truly stupid idea.

The parallel with Vietnam is not all that far-fetched. Modest numbers of American troops have now been in Afghanistan for seven years, mostly in training roles quite similar to those of the US military “advisors” whom Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy sent to South Vietnam in 1956-63. The political job of creating a pro-western, anti-communist state was entrusted to America’s man in Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem, and the South Vietnamese army had the job of fighting the communist rebels, the Viet Cong.

Unfortunately, neither Diem nor the South Vietnamese army had much success, and by the early 1960s the Viet Cong were clearly on the road to victory. So Kennedy authorised a group of South Vietnamese generals to overthrow Diem (although he seemed shocked when they killed him). And Lyndon Johnson, who succeeded Kennedy soon afterwards, authorised a rapid expansion of the American troop commitment in Vietnam. The United States took over the war. And then it lost it.

If this sounds eerily familiar, it’s because we are now at a similar juncture in America’s war in Afghanistan. Washington’s man in Kabul, President Hamid Karzai, and the Afghan army he theoretically commands have failed to quell the insurrection, and are visibly losing ground.

So the talk in Washington now is all of replacing Karzai (although it will probably be done via elections, which are easily manipulated in Afghanistan), and the American troop commitment in the country is going up to 60,000.

We already know how this story ends. There is not a lot in common between President John F. Kennedy and President George W. Bush, but they were both ideological crusaders who got the United States mired in foreign wars it could not win and did not need to win.

Obama is drifting into the same dangerous waters, and the rotten advice he is getting from strategists who believe in the “war on terror” could do for him, too.

Obama’s early initiatives

NO sooner had the music died and the Capitol cleared of celebrities than President Barack Obama got down to the business of the state.

Aware that the US was confronted by its worst economic crisis while entangled in two wars overseas, Obama had been brutally frank in his inaugural address, signalling a sharp break from his predecessor’s policies. Though renouncing the curtailment of liberties and affirming that he would “reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals”, he struck a note of defiance on terrorism and asserted that Americans would “not apologise for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defence”.

Of special interest was his message to Muslim nations when he declared that America sought a “new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect”, while he warned autocrats “who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent” that they were “on the wrong side of history”. Pious sentiments that will take a monumental effort to translate into reality!

Soon thereafter, the president waded into the intractable problems, issuing an executive order to close the ill-famed Guantanamo prison and appointing veteran politician George Mitchell as special envoy for the Middle East and the highly regarded Richard Holbrooke as special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Obama avoided references to the “war on terror”, a phrase pregnant with misgivings in the Muslim world, or to our border area as “the epicentre of global terror”. Instead, he vowed to “forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan”. Nonetheless, he cautioned “those who seek to advance their aims by introducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now, that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken”. The appointments are acknowledgment that without close, institutional American involvement, these problems could destabilise critical regions and destroy all prospects of combating terrorism. But, in more specific terms, what will Obama’s policies be in the region identified as constituting the greatest threat to the US?

An evolution in his thinking can be easily discerned. In 2007, Obama had threatened to act unilaterally against high-value targets in Pakistan if Islamabad failed to do so itself. The next year, he spoke in favour of a policy that compelled “Pakistani actions against terrorists”. A quick learner, Obama modified his stand in 2008, supporting the Biden-Lugar bill and, more importantly, emphasising that greater democracy in Pakistan was essential for tackling terrorism.

A most significant change, however, was his endorsement of the “regional approach”, an important element of which is support for the normalisation of Pakistan-India ties and the early resolution of the Kashmir issue, albeit to allay Pakistan’s concern for its eastern border so that its focus could remain on combating terrorism. Not surprisingly, these remarks upset the Indians who have worked assiduously to keep foreign involvement out of South Asia.

While not disputing the premise that Afghanistan’s problems could not be resolved without addressing the sources of support for terrorism in Pakistan, nor quibbling with the assessment that meeting Pakistan’s security concerns would encourage Islamabad to go the extra mile in its anti-terror efforts, Delhi reacted sharply to any linkage between its occupation of Kashmir and extremism in the region.

India’s concerns were heightened by British Foreign Secretary David Miliband’s article in the Guardian, in which he emphasised that the “resolution of the dispute over Kashmir would deny extremists one of their main calls to arms and allow Pakistani authorities to focus more effectively on tackling the threat on their western borders”. When Miliband echoed those sentiments during his recent visit, Indian officials could not contain their anger.

There have been other important, though subtle, changes in Obama’s thinking. In comments a week before assuming office, he charged that there was little emphasis on building infrastructure, combating narco-trafficking and ensuring reliance on the rule of law in Afghanistan. This theme was picked up by the Nato chief, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who in an article in the Washington Post denounced the Karzai regime as “ineffective”. Analysts also noted that Obama’s national security advisor, Gen James Jones, in a study for the Atlantic Council, had earlier admitted that “the international community is not winning in Afghanistan”. These have given rise to speculation that Karzai is losing the West’s confidence.

As regards Richard Holbrooke’s appointment, some observers are intrigued by the change in his designation, especially as he had himself written about the need for a “regional approach” to resolve the Afghan imbroglio. Was it then merely a change in form to mollify New Delhi, or did it represent a retreat in the face of Indian opposition, as claimed by its media and as confirmed by informed sources in Washington?Incidentally, in a recent report, the Asia Society endorses Obama’s “regional approach”, but seeks to reassure India that it need not fear the “re-hyphenation” of US relations with Pakistan and India. More importantly, it warns against any American pressure on India recalling that “the US has been wise not to try to mediate on Kashmir”, while advocating a leadership role for India in multilateral institutions. Did these considerations weigh with Obama when he remarked recently that Kashmir is a “potential tar pit diplomatically”? Holbrooke’s appointment will not be an unmixed blessing for us nor will the “regional approach” meet all our requirements, but it is nevertheless the only viable option available and therefore in our interest to ensure that the Americans do not resile from it.

The administration is in its infancy and will take time to evolve a new strategy for the region. Early indications point to Obama not hesitating to use the military option, as demonstrated by the recent drone attacks, but it will be buttressed by greater economic assistance and the provision of weapons essential for anti-terror operations.

Obama is also likely to demonstrate greater support for democracy in Pakistan as evident from his earlier message of congratulations to President Zardari, in which he praised the latter for pledging to “return to parliament the power unconstitutionally appropriated to the presidency” and characterised the judges’ return as “an important step towards the restoration of a truly independent judiciary”. But he will be a far more demanding “friend” than Bush.

Inclined to eschew personal or emotional factors, he is likely to show little patience with any weakening of our resolve and certainly none with our shenanigans. Meeting the challenges likely to come our way from the Obama administration will require a comprehensive strategy backed by national consensus and executed by a resolute leadership with skillful diplomacy.

A tale of two fronts

THE terrorist attack on Mumbai created a two-fold crisis for Pakistan. It provoked India into belligerency and also increased Pakistan’s difficulties in dealing with the terrorist challenge in its northern part. The situation on both fronts is grim.

Professional warmongers were able to turn the Indian people’s shock at the nature and scale of the raid on Mumbai into unprecedented hostility towards Pakistan. Their call to arms has so far gone unheeded and they have lost the first round to peace activists who also have appeared on both sides in greater strength than ever.

However, the jingoists are unwilling to quit the ring. On both sides arguments are being cobbled together to keep the fires of conflict raging. Their immediate target is to prevent a resumption of the composite dialogue on which hopes of a durable and fruitful peace in South Asia had come to rest. These arguments cannot be put out of the way by routine appeals to one another’s good sense; they can only be overcome through a well-considered strategy to fight the scourge of terrorism.

A large number of people in both India and Pakistan will concede that the principles of good neighbourliness and common interests demand that the two states should always be able to talk to each other without any reservations. Yet they find it extremely hard to resume their dialogue and this at a time when the only alternative to negotiations is apocalyptic disaster.

The dominant Indian opinion, as far as one could gather from brief exchanges with a cross-section of Delhi civil society, rules out official-level talks with Pakistan on the basis of its interpretation of the Mumbai carnage, its reservations about the change of regime in Pakistan, its expectations of US success in twisting Pakistan’s arm, and its lack of faith in civil society (particularly of Pakistan) initiatives.

These assumptions can be better addressed in the reverse order.

The Indian elite’s loss of faith in civil society’s capacity to catalyse a positive change shows it has not taken account of the fact that the peace constituency in both India and Pakistan has become much larger than ever. The size and spontaneity of anti-war demonstrations held after Nov 26 were not witnessed during previous confrontations.

The signs of despair in warmongers’ ranks, as evident in their moving further and further away from reason, confirm civil society’s accession to strength. Its progress cannot be as quick and dramatic as the state’s adventures simply because it lacks the latter’s capacity to legitimise any abuse of authority. In any case, one is astounded to see civil society denigrated in our subcontinent, home to one of the world’s most outstanding civil society movements — better known as the unarmed people’s struggle for freedom from the greatest imperialist power in history.

Some of the hawks who make a living by confounding their audience with their arbitrary analyses argue that India should not talk to Pakistan because that will undermine US efforts to force the latter to behave. This reflects a degree of confidence in the effectiveness of the US anti-terror strategy no independent observer is prepared to endorse. At the moment the US policy is raising more terrorists in Pakistan’s tribal belt than Nato forces can kill. Any increase in the terrorists’ threat to Pakistan’s stability cannot be in India’s interest. Fortunately, saner elements in Delhi are conscious of this and are therefore wary of firing at Pakistan over American shoulders.

The Indian observers’ poor opinion of Pakistan’s latest experiment in democratic governance comes out when they are asked to consider the possibility that the perpetrators of the Mumbai outrage wanted to rock the Zardari-led government. Quite a few of them have not been able to get over the end of their romance with Gen Musharraf. Many Pakistanis will agree with their Indian friends that the present dispensation is a pale version of a representative government. However, what the Indian critics choose to ignore is the fact that their jingoist rhetoric is tilting the balance against Pakistan’s civilian authority.

The strongest Indian argument against talking formally to Pakistan is that while they do not wish to hold the Pakistan government directly responsible for the Mumbai affair the level of organisation and expertise evident in the operation could not have been possible without the backing or complicity of some privileged groups. Besides, according to them, their claim that the raiders belonged to Pakistan has not been effectively rebutted. Thus, Nov 26 was to India what 9/11 was to the US and the sequential developments could not be any different.

It is possible to question this line of argument, particularly the attempt to legitimise the US invasion of Afghanistan. One may only look at the havoc wrought by the Bush team of hawks. They have certainly punished the Afghan people with a vengeance, the innocent Afghans more than the Taliban, but they have also made the quasi-religious militants almost invincible. No US expert, civilian or military, entertains hopes of victory in Afghanistan and attempts have already been made to find a way to share power with the Taliban. Did India want this scenario re-enacted on a broader scale? One may believe the Indians when they reply in the negative.

That leaves the question of Pakistan’s meeting Indian demands for “costs” for Mumbai and the surrender of suspects which are said to be essential for defusing the situation.As has been argued by many people, for Islamabad the threat from terrorists is far more serious than India’s ultimatums. Pakistan’s very survival in its present form depends on eliminating the terrorists’ challenge. The Indian pressure for its satisfaction only adds to the urgency of this task. It is obvious that a series of steps will have to be taken to ensure peace along the country’s southern border.

To begin with, more teeth need to be put into the hitherto tepid crackdown on organisations known for fomenting militancy. The trial of leaders of cross-border forays should begin expeditiously. Pakistan’s bona fides will be strengthened if these trials are fair and transparent. The possibility of inviting jurists from the region is worth exploring. These measures should help Pakistan regain the international community’s vitally needed confidence and support. It may not be necessary for the prime minister to think of a new law to punish Pakistanis for serious crimes abroad. Section 125 of the Penal Code already provides for life imprisonment for anyone who “wages war against the government of any Asiatic power in alliance or at peace with Pakistan or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war.”

Unfortunately, however, the Indian demands have given some political groups in Pakistan one more reason to oppose government moves against the militants. Islamabad is being accused of cowardly yielding to pressure from across the border. They don’t see the militants doing anything wrong in Fata or Swat or anywhere else. Among other things, this means that the southern frontier cannot be secured in peace without achieving peace along the northern border.

There the problem is not only the drone raids but the whole US-Nato strategy. So long as this strategy is followed Pakistan will not be out of the danger zone. Thus, instead of quarrelling over a single act of terrorism, Pakistan and India should join hands and seek other regional collaborators’ help in bringing the US and Nato operations under regional or UN control to settle Afghanistan’s future.

A tale of two fronts

THE terrorist attack on Mumbai created a two-fold crisis for Pakistan. It provoked India into belligerency and also increased Pakistan’s difficulties in dealing with the terrorist challenge in its northern part. The situation on both fronts is grim.

Professional warmongers were able to turn the Indian people’s shock at the nature and scale of the raid on Mumbai into unprecedented hostility towards Pakistan. Their call to arms has so far gone unheeded and they have lost the first round to peace activists who also have appeared on both sides in greater strength than ever.

However, the jingoists are unwilling to quit the ring. On both sides arguments are being cobbled together to keep the fires of conflict raging. Their immediate target is to prevent a resumption of the composite dialogue on which hopes of a durable and fruitful peace in South Asia had come to rest. These arguments cannot be put out of the way by routine appeals to one another’s good sense; they can only be overcome through a well-considered strategy to fight the scourge of terrorism.

A large number of people in both India and Pakistan will concede that the principles of good neighbourliness and common interests demand that the two states should always be able to talk to each other without any reservations. Yet they find it extremely hard to resume their dialogue and this at a time when the only alternative to negotiations is apocalyptic disaster.

The dominant Indian opinion, as far as one could gather from brief exchanges with a cross-section of Delhi civil society, rules out official-level talks with Pakistan on the basis of its interpretation of the Mumbai carnage, its reservations about the change of regime in Pakistan, its expectations of US success in twisting Pakistan’s arm, and its lack of faith in civil society (particularly of Pakistan) initiatives.

These assumptions can be better addressed in the reverse order.

The Indian elite’s loss of faith in civil society’s capacity to catalyse a positive change shows it has not taken account of the fact that the peace constituency in both India and Pakistan has become much larger than ever. The size and spontaneity of anti-war demonstrations held after Nov 26 were not witnessed during previous confrontations.

The signs of despair in warmongers’ ranks, as evident in their moving further and further away from reason, confirm civil society’s accession to strength. Its progress cannot be as quick and dramatic as the state’s adventures simply because it lacks the latter’s capacity to legitimise any abuse of authority. In any case, one is astounded to see civil society denigrated in our subcontinent, home to one of the world’s most outstanding civil society movements — better known as the unarmed people’s struggle for freedom from the greatest imperialist power in history.

Some of the hawks who make a living by confounding their audience with their arbitrary analyses argue that India should not talk to Pakistan because that will undermine US efforts to force the latter to behave. This reflects a degree of confidence in the effectiveness of the US anti-terror strategy no independent observer is prepared to endorse. At the moment the US policy is raising more terrorists in Pakistan’s tribal belt than Nato forces can kill. Any increase in the terrorists’ threat to Pakistan’s stability cannot be in India’s interest. Fortunately, saner elements in Delhi are conscious of this and are therefore wary of firing at Pakistan over American shoulders.

The Indian observers’ poor opinion of Pakistan’s latest experiment in democratic governance comes out when they are asked to consider the possibility that the perpetrators of the Mumbai outrage wanted to rock the Zardari-led government. Quite a few of them have not been able to get over the end of their romance with Gen Musharraf. Many Pakistanis will agree with their Indian friends that the present dispensation is a pale version of a representative government. However, what the Indian critics choose to ignore is the fact that their jingoist rhetoric is tilting the balance against Pakistan’s civilian authority.

The strongest Indian argument against talking formally to Pakistan is that while they do not wish to hold the Pakistan government directly responsible for the Mumbai affair the level of organisation and expertise evident in the operation could not have been possible without the backing or complicity of some privileged groups. Besides, according to them, their claim that the raiders belonged to Pakistan has not been effectively rebutted. Thus, Nov 26 was to India what 9/11 was to the US and the sequential developments could not be any different.

It is possible to question this line of argument, particularly the attempt to legitimise the US invasion of Afghanistan. One may only look at the havoc wrought by the Bush team of hawks. They have certainly punished the Afghan people with a vengeance, the innocent Afghans more than the Taliban, but they have also made the quasi-religious militants almost invincible. No US expert, civilian or military, entertains hopes of victory in Afghanistan and attempts have already been made to find a way to share power with the Taliban. Did India want this scenario re-enacted on a broader scale? One may believe the Indians when they reply in the negative.

That leaves the question of Pakistan’s meeting Indian demands for “costs” for Mumbai and the surrender of suspects which are said to be essential for defusing the situation.As has been argued by many people, for Islamabad the threat from terrorists is far more serious than India’s ultimatums. Pakistan’s very survival in its present form depends on eliminating the terrorists’ challenge. The Indian pressure for its satisfaction only adds to the urgency of this task. It is obvious that a series of steps will have to be taken to ensure peace along the country’s southern border.

To begin with, more teeth need to be put into the hitherto tepid crackdown on organisations known for fomenting militancy. The trial of leaders of cross-border forays should begin expeditiously. Pakistan’s bona fides will be strengthened if these trials are fair and transparent. The possibility of inviting jurists from the region is worth exploring. These measures should help Pakistan regain the international community’s vitally needed confidence and support. It may not be necessary for the prime minister to think of a new law to punish Pakistanis for serious crimes abroad. Section 125 of the Penal Code already provides for life imprisonment for anyone who “wages war against the government of any Asiatic power in alliance or at peace with Pakistan or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war.”

Unfortunately, however, the Indian demands have given some political groups in Pakistan one more reason to oppose government moves against the militants. Islamabad is being accused of cowardly yielding to pressure from across the border. They don’t see the militants doing anything wrong in Fata or Swat or anywhere else. Among other things, this means that the southern frontier cannot be secured in peace without achieving peace along the northern border.

There the problem is not only the drone raids but the whole US-Nato strategy. So long as this strategy is followed Pakistan will not be out of the danger zone. Thus, instead of quarrelling over a single act of terrorism, Pakistan and India should join hands and seek other regional collaborators’ help in bringing the US and Nato operations under regional or UN control to settle Afghanistan’s future.

Swar, o Swat!

The people of Swat are confused. They wonder how the might of the Pakistan Army cannot subdue the Taliban of Swat. The Swat insurgency and the “counter-insurgency” must be given priority attention by the country’s intelligentsia.

With the beginning of “Operation Rah-e-Haq” in November 2007 people hoped that security in the region will improve. They were optimistic about the operation and welcomed the military with flowers and garlands. But gradually over time this trust receded and now it is practically non-existent.

People now have their reservations about the operation. They ask pertinent questions about it. They see a lack of willingness on the part of the “state” to curb the militancy. This perception is now held by the intelligentsia, particularly the Pukhtun intelligentsia. They contend that if the state’s military can stand up to a military as strong and large as India’s, how can it not handle an internal insurgency carried out by a few thousand armed men?

And whenever the state expresses and acts on the will to bring law and order to the region it is able to do so, as happened in the February 2008 election. Before the election everyone was concerned whether the election was possible in the Swat valley. But to everybody’s amazement it was not only held but held peacefully, except in one constituency.

People ask who made the “miracle” possible then. Again this goes in the line of the argument that if “powerful state actors” will it then things can be settled in weeks.

The Swat issue started with the advent of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The TNSM was founded in 1989 in Malakand Agency at a time when the Soviets were leaving Afghanistan. The rise of the TNSM in Malakand Division at a time when the Taliban were gaining power in Afghanistan is not mere coincidence.

Overnight an elderly man rose from the hills of Maidan and became a hero. Before that nobody knew who Sufi Mohammad was. And later his movement was crushed in a couple of days because the state willed it – and after that there was complete peace in the valley. Tourists again began to pour back in and life once again became vibrant.

The peace was broken when the son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad gave his first sermon on the FM radio. It was post-9/11, and there was apparently drastic shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan became a frontline state in the war on terror, but the Pukhtun intelligentsia thinks – and this is conception shared by many others as well – that its “assets” had to be guarded as well, and hence Swat was made a “haven” for some of them.

The unwillingness of the state to fight the militancy head-on, they claim, was evident by the way it loosened the grip which it had established over the militants in their stronghold of Gut Peuchar in Matta tehsil. Many residents of the valley wonder whether this was done by design.

Another claim is that the tactics and strategies the Swat militants use are not the work of semi-literate mullahs. The intention is to crush any hint of resistance from among the local population and hence the daily killing of people and the hanging of their dead bodies in public squares. Similarly, targeting the leadership is a tried-and-tested war tactic throughout history. Could it be that the former “assets” of the state are now turning their guns on their former benefactors? This is a question on a lot of people’s minds.

Time to battle the common enemy

Through history, people have tended to come together to face common enemies or ward off a dangerous threat. The sometimes unusual alliances seen during major wars, crossing boundaries of ideology and belief, are an example of this. Such allegiances have cropped up in Europe, in China and in many other places through history. We see them too in the opportunistic political alliances that we have seen again and again in our country.

But even while we are up against an enemy of enormous dimensions in Pakistan, the realization that the scale of the threat is immense has still apparently to dawn. There are numerous divisions and sub-divisions in society and these have indeed been a factor in allowing this enemy to grow, sometimes insidiously like a kind of weed. Occasionally, on the murky city walls of Karachi, one comes across a small sticker saying ‘Stop Talibanisation in Pakistan’. It seems though that this is the extent of our protest against a phenomenon that now threatens to engulf the whole country and the way of life within it.

This is not an alarmist representation of facts. While it must be hoped such an eventuality never arises, the danger signs cannot simply be ignored or wished away. Even in Karachi, our most cosmopolitan city, there are neighbourhoods where the Taliban are said to be in control of daily life, ordering people to attend mosques or adopt other modes of ‘Islamic’ behaviour. Madrassahs spawn zealots across the urban centre and warnings from the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the most influential political force in Karachi, of a rapid growth in Talibanization have gained added fervour and pitch over the last few months. In Lahore, there have been within the last six months at least three bombings targeting what extremists see as a lifestyle that goes against religious belief. Tiny juice shops, apparently used as dating spots by young student couples, were bombed in October last year. Those who suffered most were the owners of the small-scale businesses, whose tiny cafes were damaged and who have lost many customers. Similar low intensity blasts targeted the World Performing Arts Festival and two city theatres. Other businesses and even co-ed schools have received menacing phone calls warning them that the attacks on educational institutions in Swat could be repeated elsewhere.

This indeed has already happened in Peshawar, where schools have been attacked by thugs. There is also dangerous evidence that the evil that has taken hold in Swat, leading to boys as young as 16 being beaten as they had failed to grow a proper beard, is spreading. Reports from Quetta speak of women being barred from restaurants, which have been reserved for men only, and of militants warning other cafes to enforce the same rule, refusing to serve women on their premises.

Yet, despite these developments, divisions in our midst prevent us from opening a joint front against the militants. The two largest political parties in the country, the PPP and the PML-N, remain locked in an uneasy relationship that prevents cooperation. Distrust exists everywhere, with the acrimonious tussle between the Governor and the Chief Minister in the Punjab adding to the bitter after taste that lingers everywhere. The lawyer’s movement has too been effectively split, with pro-PPP lawyers more or less pulling out. In circles from where voices against Talibanisation could be most vociferously raised, the view that a democratic government, especially one led by a party that still labels itself as ‘liberal’, must be given a chance dampens zeal. This opinion is a legitimate one, but political affiliation must not stand in the way of principal.

These divisions though are minor ones compared to a far more dangerous chasm that exists. Everywhere, sometimes even in the most unexpected places, it is possible to find people who back the Taliban. A few do so on the basis that they are a force that opposes the US; most though believe they stand for what is good and true to religion. Such voices can be heard within the bureaucracy, the armed forces and among many citizens. The fact that they exist prevents an all-out battle from being waged against the Taliban. Indeed, there seems to be a tendency to ‘glorify’ the bearded fighters who have terrorized areas across the north. Tales are told of their miraculous victories, the skill and determination of their combatants and their ‘good’ deeds. It is only over the past few days that we have begun also to hear of undiluted evil in places like Swat.

The complication means there have as yet been few public protests against Talibanisation. Women in Lahore, Islamabad and other cities have rallied against the mayhem unleashed in Swat. But these token gatherings have not grown into anything bigger. Surely major groups, including mainstream parties, professionals, students and labour unions should all come together against the kind of madness that has overtaken us. It has already devastated the lives of thousands. The true toll is not known. Outside the northern areas too, terrifying tales are heard. In Lahore, two sisters attending an elite college suddenly quit after their father, lured into its fold by a religious group, ordered them into strict seclusion. In other city neighbourhoods parents tell tales of similar efforts to indoctrinate adult children. In Islamabad, a young man kidnapped by militants but returned after the payment of a huge ransom, has himself reportedly adopted an extremist lifestyle.

Many kinds of extremist groups exist in our midst. Some use guns to drive home their message; others nothing more than words, pamphlets or websites. In many ways both are equally dangerous. They have contributed to the dichotomy that now exists and prevents a united stand when extremists bomb schools or murder people in cold blood. The widespread perception that the US-led war on terror is a grotesquely unfair one adds to the complications. Barack Obama will need to move well beyond the symbolically significant closing down of the Guantanamo Bay prison to bring about any change in this perception.

Internally too, there is a need for a re-think – perhaps to match the one currently taking place in the White House. Some fires need to be put out immediately to prevent them destroying structures that have taken years or decades to build. An enormous mistake was made through the Musharraf years and even before that by failing to stamp out the initial sparks of militancy. Today, we are beginning to feel the full ferocity of the blaze these sparks have ignited. The question is whether we can bring it under some kind of control before it chars, blackens and finally completely devours our society.