Experimenting with Democracy

Twice in recent weeks, the Balochistan Assembly couldn’t hold its winter session due to lack of quorum. This happened on two consecutive occasions as 15 assembly members out of 65 turned up in the first session while only six were present in the second. This was despite the fact that 63 MPAs are part of the PPP-led coalition government in the province and sit on the treasury benches. It is certainly a cause for alarm that the 45 provincial ministers and the rest, almost all of whom hold some official position, are unable to ensure quorum of the provincial assembly so that its sessions are held in time, the grave issues confronting Balochistan and Pakistan are debated and legislative business is conducted.

There could be a reason as to why the Balochistan Assembly failed to meet due to absence of the required number of its members. It is argued that the MPAs on one occasion had to attend a function of Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, who finally found time to visit Balochistan to belatedly console the unfortunate victims of the Ziarat earthquake. On the second occasion, the MPAs found it more exciting to attend the wedding of the son of federal minister Syed Khurshid Shah in Karachi than staying back in Quetta and taking part in the normally lacklustre proceedings of the provincial assembly. However, the assembly speaker and the parliamentary leaders of the political parties making up the ruling coalition should have figured out in advance that it would be inopportune to convene the assembly’s session when such momentous events such as the prime minister’s visit or a royal wedding were taking place.

The way the Balochistan Assembly is functioning and the manner in which the provincial government is being run cannot inspire confidence among those who were hoping for a change following the installation of democratic governments in keeping with the verdict of the voters in the Feb 18 general elections. It is business as usual, with the lawmakers once again indulging in their familiar pastime of seeking and enjoying the perks of power at the cost of public interest.

It would not be fair to single out Balochistan for its poor state of governance, but the purpose of highlighting the shortcomings of Chief Minister Nawab Mohammad Aslam Raisani’s unwieldy provincial government was to show how Pakistan’s latest experiment with democracy was already causing disappointment to all those who had attached so much hopes with the February polls.

Of the 65 assembly members in Balochistan, only one sits on the empty opposition benches. Sardar Yar Mohammad Rind, a former federal minister, cannot join the government due to tribal disputes with Chief Minister Raisani. He reportedly attended just one session of the assembly, to take oath as MPA, and that too in the company of heavily-armed guards. Being powerful tribal elders, the two Baloch chieftains have been running a feud and are, therefore, constrained to remain in opposite camps. Sardar Bakhtiar Khan Domki, son of the late Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s son-in-law Sardar Chakar Khan Domki, could be classified as an independent MPA as he isn’t part of the coalition government despite reposing trust in the chief minister at the time of Mr Raisani’s election. One could well imagine that there is practically no opposition in the Balochistan Assembly, and, therefore, no check on the working of the government. In the absence of any real opposition, some PPP lawmakers took it upon themselves to oppose their own government in Balochistan recently when they staged a walkout from the assembly to show solidarity with a party MPA and minister, Ghazala Gola; she was upset at the portfolio of minority affairs being taken away from her and given to a minister affiliated with the PML-Q, Basant Lal Gulshan. Three PPP ministers and an MPA, led by parliamentary party leader Sadiq Umrani, staged the walkout in protest and held a press conference in which they expressed reservations on the affairs of the coalition government headed by their own party member, Sardar Raisani, who otherwise has an honest reputation and is admired for his straightforward nature.

This is something familiar not only in Balochistan but also other provinces where coalition governments are in place. Protests at allocation of ministerial portfolios is an old story. Political parties without ideology lack discipline as its leaders and members seek personal glory and are driven by self-interest. A coalition government cannot have direction because the ruling partners tend to pull it in different directions. Balochistan suffers more due to its coalition governments as its electorate, belonging to different ethnic and political groups, always gives a split mandate in elections. Secular, progressive and nationalist politicians have no qualms joining hands with Islamists and centrists to form coalition governments in Balochistan even though they make strange bedfellows.

Like Balochistan, the federal government too is an amalgamation of political parties espousing conflicting causes and ideologies. It was, therefore, not surprising that the federal cabinet’s strength has already risen to 55 and is poised to become even larger once Altaf Hussain’s MQM and Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s JUI-F are accommodated. The coalition partners, from the PPP to the JUI-F and the ANP to the MQM, are already pulling it in different directions. Prime Minister Gilani, by now known more for his interesting and often meaningless statements than anything substantial in terms of his administrative skills, watches helplessly while he panders to the wishes of the leaders of the coalition parties, and at the same time take orders from the his party boss: President Asif Ali Zardari doesn’t want to step down as the head of the PPP and become the president of all Pakistanis irrespective of their political affiliation.

In Sindh, the PPP has entered into a coalition with the MQM, a party with which it shares little owing to the two parties’ mutual distrust. Sooner or later, the two might encounter serious disputes and the only way they could stay together is to allow each other a free hand in running their respective ministries.

The situation in the NWFP isn’t much different. The PPP and ANP always make uneasy coalition partners and this time is no exception. Paralysed by the rising militancy and violence, the coalition government enjoys an unassailable majority in the NWFP Assembly and the JUI-F-led opposition too is largely a friendly opposition. The PML-N hasn’t taken up the insignificant ministerial berths that were offered to it by the ANP and the PPP but it doesn’t want to sit in the opposition as this would deprive its MPAs of government patronage and funds.

However, the provincial government cannot function normally due to the serious law-and-order problems afflicting the province. The expectations attached to it by the voters cannot be fulfilled and public trust in the coalition government’s ability to deliver is gradually diminishing. Add to it the familiar problems that arise between coalition partners in our country and there is this growing feeling that the ANP and the PPP could in due course develop problems of mutual mistrust.

Punjab probably is the best-administered province at present, primarily due to Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s sincerity of purpose and governance skills. But Governor Salmaan Taseer would not let it work smoothly and the PPP doesn’t want to remain out of the provincial government even if Nawaz Sharif wants it to quit the coalition in Punjab. Coalition politics in Punjab too is causing frustration and could even undo the delicate balance of power now in place in Pakistan’s biggest province.

It would be unfortunate if Pakistan’s latest experiment with democracy falls by the wayside due to the lust for power among our politicians.

Rethinking Conspiracies!

The debacle of 1971 taught us that it is dangerous for a country to be cocooned in an artificial sense of immortality. But it is also disempowering and futile for a nation to live with the paranoia of imminent death. Not a day goes by without our prophets of doom (who incidentally are often proponents of non-representative power elites in Pakistan) bellowing that a US-led global plot to divide Pakistan into pieces is close to fruition. Their smoking gun is a redrawn map of Pakistan (now widely redistributed over the Internet) that was published by the Armed Forces Journal in 2006. There are thousands of such journals in the US that publish all kinds of crazy ideas produced by analysts and think tanks. But our conspiracy-mongers are convinced that this lone article is irrefutable proof that “America” wishes Pakistan’s dismemberment. Further, we are also cautioned that if the current democratic dispensation does not sort itself out, or is sorted out by our Khaki saviours, the skies will most definitely cave into Pakistan within months.

Yet, any attempt by the civil society or the civilian government to rethink conceptions of national interest and national security that heighten citizens’ insecurity and have brought Pakistan to this sorry pass is labelled as treason by the same motley vanguards of our strategic interest and moral values. At a recent talk show organised at NUST in Islamabad, one such clown (whom I shall not name, to avoid drawing attention to his ceaseless, virulent diatribes about trivia and instead call him Mr X) declared that the present civilian rulers were all CIA agents. An inquisitive student asked what proof backed this very serious charge. His response amidst wild cheers from other students in the audience: When Zardari meets the American ambassador before swearing oath as president and when all ministers frequent the US Embassy to get security briefings, what additional evidence do we need. It was an open and shut case.

It seemed futile to argue that the PPP-led government’s spineless interaction with the Bush administration was more a reflection of a decadent state, a purposeless ruling elite and a disempowered society, where unconditionally bowing before power is emerging as the accepted norm. Such, unconditional surrender to power within the country and abroad points to our alarming degeneration into a predatory state and society and not necessarily to a grand CIA design to engineer electoral outcomes in Pakistan. Mr X was outraged that Pakistan’s “pseudo armchair intellectuals” wished to impose western-style democracy in a Muslim state that deserved an authoritarian system of governance. To support his thesis he argued that if democracy were allowed in our households, children would outvote parents and order in KFC all the time! Just like loving parents looked out for minor kids, a benevolent autocrat should rule our “illiterate” nation with good intentions but an iron hand.

The argument was that there is something unique about the “Muslim-psyche” that makes us ill-suited to a government of the people, for the people and by the people. We needed a strong leader who could revive national pride, self-respect and Iqbal’s “khudi.” Mr X emphasised that the PPP’s top leadership returned under a deal guaranteed by the US and Zardari was koshered by the despicable NRO, but conveniently forgot that the other partner in the US-brokered deal was Musharraf, our army chief-president, who was the author of the NRO that whitewashed Mr Zardari. While the glib talk of Iqbal’s “khudi” translated into appealing rhetoric and sound bites, Mr X did not explain how pride and self-respect could be injected in the citizens and leaders of a nation that had resigned itself to that fact that it was unfit even to govern itself.

The invidious idea that poverty, illiteracy and the peculiar nature of South Asians robs them of legal agency and renders them unfit to rule themselves was propounded in a theory called the “white-man’s burden” and not Iqbal’s “khudi.” But it was the elixir that Mr X prescribed to get Pakistan out of the woods that gives perspective to this hackneyed narrative: the PPP government should be given six months to sort itself out; if it doesn’t the military should step in and clean up all our corrupt politicians. This is a familiar argument that our hapless nation has been fed with since its inception. And we have choked on it every single time. The identity of those appealing to the “moral responsibility” of our praetorians and preparing the nation to be reinvaded and saved from the malice of our own representatives is irrelevant. But the contradictions in the failed ideology that they shamelessly continue to preach must be addressed.

Is it not amazing that the poor and the illiterate – the worst victims of malfeasance and mal-governance in the country, and the ones supposedly incapable of determining where their true good lies and thus need to be repeatedly saved by our khaki adventurers – are actually the most ardent democrats who take their right to vote seriously and exercise it every time? Is it not unbelievable that merely a few months after the demise of a dictatorship that has left the country in a deeper hole than it has ever been in, there are voices beckoning khaki messiahs to save them all over again? It is about time that we bury repeatedly failed ideas and the magical hatchet that can even dig into the rock bottom. Why must we dream of knights with shining armour or creative revolutionary ideas instead of pursuing the screamingly obvious option of building processes and institutions of democracy? This course will take time but it has a proven record of safety and workability in our neighbourhood and around the world.

It has been said before, and it must be repeatedly reiterated. No one said democracy was the most efficient system of governance – only the safest, that nurtures long-term stability. It is almost a truism that democratic chaos that enables a nation to hold leaders accountable every few years – together with an independent judiciary and a watchful media – is much better than an efficient dictatorship rooted in the contemptuous belief that a nation of 170 million Muslims is too impotent to make sensible choices about its life and future. The best thing that could happen to Pakistan is for it to be blessed with a new breed of leaders with their credibility, integrity and dignity intact and the courage and the wisdom to drag us out of the vicious cycle we are caught up in. But leaders are not conceived or born in political vacuum. The second-best option for the country, thus, is that the democratic process – however flawed and corrupt – be allowed to run uninterruptedly to provide us a chance to find and groom such leaders.

Pakistan is not a laboratory and we are not guinea pigs destined to endure failed experiments of authoritarianism and controlled democracy. Once we put to rest the debate about reinventing a tried-and-tested system of governance founded on the principles of democracy and equality, we need to reconstruct our concept of national interest and how it informs our ideas of national security and national identity. There are a few preliminary points that need to be made in this regard.

One, states are not monolithic entities. It is disingenuous to project the Armed Forces Journal as the gospel on the collective thoughts and intentions of the American people. The Bush administration pursued disastrous policies with an arrogant style, and that led to the proliferation of anti-Americanism across the world, and especially in Pakistan and the Muslim world. But that doesn’t mean “America” as a whole is either evil or conspiring to bring Pakistan down. There are competing power elites within the US, as in all other countries. And we must find ways to work with policymakers within the US who comprehend the need for a rethink of the US policy towards Pakistan. Indiscriminately drumming up hate against “the evil empire” might be cathartic for some, but doesn’t necessarily promote Pakistan’s national interest.

Two, conspiracies have probably been hatched since time immemorial. Even within the nation-state context, all superpowers in recorded history have attempted to influence the policies and actions of other states. While foul precedents are no justification, in reality the US foreign policy has been no less or more amoral than that of any other empire in recent history. But the more crucial question for us is: Why “US conspiracies” work in some countries and not others? Why have CIA regime-change operations failed in America’s backyard – against Cuba’s Castro and Venezuela’s Chavez – or even in our neighbourhood against Iran? If successive US administrations have been able to influence the manner in which successive Pakistani government’s (both military and civilian) conceive and pursue our national interest, where does the fault really lie?

And, finally, Pakistani nationalism must not be defined by its hostility towards India or the US. Such defensive antagonism breeds paranoia and undermines self-confidence. For a majority of Pakistanis that constitute the post-1971 generation, Pakistan is as embedded a reality as can be. The idea of its creation is a historical matter that no longer needs to be defended for the sake of justifying the country’s existence. It also means that this generation is free to define our purpose and our national consciousness independent of India, and we must. For reactive nationalism is continuing to fetter our true potential and calling as a nation.

Behind the Crisis in Swat

The uprising in Swat has to be seen as part of the wider conflict that has engulfed the region and Pakistan since 9/11. The “war on terror” has only aggravated the social situation in Swat and given birth to a movement which has its roots in history. The Swati Taliban are not organised on a localised agenda, not on a tribal basis.

In Swat feudals are known as “Khans” while “Pakhtun” refers to those who have cultivated land and are prosperous. “Sayyeds” and “Mians” generally also have land. This particular section of society has traditionally controlled wealth and politics for centuries before it was challenged from two sides: the emerging commercial class and the new middle classes, and the landless.

Those not owning land consist of two groups. The first are the old inhabitants of the valley who were marginalised by the area’s conquest by Yusufzais in the 16th century. They consist of the Gujars and Ajar. The latter, known in Pashto as Kasbgar, include blacksmiths, cobblers and hair-dressers. “All alike are directly or indirectly dependent on the landowners both politically and economically,” in the words of anthropologist Fredrik Bath.

In some ways, Swat’s society is divided on the lines of the caste system, or social groups “of a caste type,” as Bath called it. The body of a commoner cannot be buried near the grave of a Mian. However, the emergence of a “new middle class” — such as real-estate agents, transporters, contractors, people in the armed forces and the bureaucracy, and traders–has been a significant development in challenging the old khanite landed classes in NWFP. Remittances from people whose wealth and power comes from sources other than land also play a crucial role in the development of the emerging middle class.

The appearances of new social players on the social and political arena can be judged from their roles in different movements. The most important are the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). These movements, in the guise of Islamism, are the expressions of the desires of the new middle class and other deprived classes. In one way or the other, they have challenged the dominance of the existing feudal landed autocracy.

The TNSM was founded in 1992 by Sufi Mohammad who, after leaving the Jamaat-e-Islami, launched a movement that enjoyed the support of various sections of society, including ex-servicemen and traders. The TNSM built its support on the criticism of two issues vital to society: the judicial system imposed on the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) and the corrupt electoral and political system of Pakistan. The TNSM rejected electoral politics. Sufi Muhammad saw no hope in society’s Islamisation through parliament and opposed the Islamic parties that want to bring changes through parliament. In a speech in Kalam, he said: “There is no room for the vote in Islam and the concept of democracy which some religious political parties are demanding is wrong.”

The Supreme Court’s verdict on Feb 12, 1994, that PATA regulations are unconstitutional, not only provided legitimacy to the struggle of the TNSM but also gave it impetus. The verdict was followed by mass uprisings in Malakand and adjacent areas. The PATA regulations had replaced the rules of Swat state with its merger to Pakistan in 1969.

After the merger of the ruling family and the Khans, they occupied the lands of the poor, the commoners’ lands. Force was used which resulted in clashes. The year 1969 also saw a mass peasant upheaval in the country. The landless occupied the land they cultivated. These settlements are still pending in courts. In the 1990s with the arrival of neo-liberalism, there came the speculation boom in the real-estate business. By now, as a result of autocratic rules and distortions in the Constitution, the existing judicial system in Pakistan was corrupt to the core. Settlement of land cases takes tens of years. Real-estate agents see their land or their commission stuck up in the judicial quagmire. The TNSM was built up on public sentiments and demanded the Sharia as an answer to public grievances. When it came to impose the Sharia the most significant measure of all was the rapid settlement of land disputes.

In 2001, on the eve of the American attack on Afghanistan, public mobilisation of the TNSM for jihad and subsequent events prove to be catastrophic. The debacle in Afghanistan and the arrest of leaders of the movement on return from Afghanistan paved the way for the MMA’s gains in the 2002 elections. The leadership of the MMA mobilised the rural poor to defeat the politics of the Khanite landed classes. But the MMA government was soon to be found corrupt to the core as well. Very soon MMA alienated the masses and created distrust in the rural poor.

Islamism builds at the expense of liberal-left-secular-nationalist movement. Pakhtun nationalism (ANP) and Islamic reformism (MMA) failed in challenging western domination and the ruling elite. The Islamism of the Taliban therefore became a force to counter these, with the corrupt rulers portrayed as responsible for the poverty and misery in the country. Poverty, which declined in the 1970s and ’80s, has increased since the 1990s.The income of the bottom 20 per cent of households decreased to 5.7 per cent, while in the 1970s and ’80s it was 7.5 to 8 per cent. This decline in the total share is more significant for the poorest if inflation is also included.

War and the integration of Pakistan into the world market paved the way for emergences of new movements and changes to old ones. The TNSM was transformed dramatically in the last two years or so. In a society marked with ethnic, cultural, and tribal lineages, Islam and ‘Islamic’ leaders could transcend the boundaries and unite people for a common cause. In the name of Islam and Sharia class interests can be disseminated. That is where Fazlullah appears on the scene.

Fazlullah, a school dropout in Mingora and a chairlift operator who worked for Rs1,500, emerged as the leader of the Pakistani Taliban of Swat, at the age of 28. “Quick justice and efficient government, this is something that people wanted and this is what the people saw” in Fazlullah, as Prince Asfandiar Amir Zeb, a member of the former ruling family, remarked in an interview with journalist David Montero. Fazlullah’s madressa, at Imamderi, was built with the support of the poor and the new middle classes. People across the valley, including women, donated $2.5 million for the cause. But resentment developed in some sections of the middle classes as the movement became more radicalised. Today the militant section of the movement consists of the rural poor, whereas the middle and poorer classes had dominated the TNSM.

Fazlullah communicates with his supporters, through his FM radio. As analyst Khadim Hussain has said: “The marginalised groups have a sense of empowerment in their state of powerlessness. Both the state and the traditional elite, with the political elite of the valley, unfortunately, have all along failed to respond to the aspirations of those who remain marginalised in the already marginalised society of Swat valley.”

The militants are targeting the Khans regardless of their political affiliations and have given their fight a class dimension which, in the context of exploitation and oppression that has gone on for centuries, acquires significance in their battle “to win the hearts and minds” of the people.

Imperious Cronyism

The US presidential election was an uplifting experience for the citizens of the world. The Barack Obama story has been a fairytale so far. And irrespective of how rational or cynical we get, many of us secretly like fairytales. Irrespective of how vehemently one disagrees with the bitter, divisive and immoral politics and policies of the Bush administration, the choice of Obama certainly engenders admiration for the American nation that continues to challenge itself and then rise to meet those challenges. It also highlights the need for countries such as ours – where anti-Americanism has been on the rise – to understand that the US is not a monolith, and that there is need to distinguish between the US government and the American people in order to develop a sustainable relationship between the two nations.

In his victory speech, President-elect Barack Obama highlighted the ideals – democracy, liberty, opportunity and unyielding hope – that he would continue to struggle for. He paid rich tribute to Senator John McCain, and was also mindful of those who had sided with McCain in the electoral contest. “And to those Americans whose support I have yet to earn,” said Obama, “I may not have won your vote tonight, but I hear your voices, I need your help and I will be your president too.” The policies of the president-elect will certainly be those informed by the ideology of the Democratic Party. But in stating that “I will listen to you, especially when we disagree,” his style and symbolism was reassuring to those who had not chosen him.

An individual once elected to public office is expected to serve the entire constituency, and not just those who voted him to office. But such an obvious point is lost on our own politicos, whose sole function in office remains dispensation of state patronage for self-aggrandisement and to promote cronyism. None of the political parties in Pakistan can claim to have placed merit above loyalty and partisanship, and are culpable in various degrees. But when it comes to perpetuating cronyism the audacity and malevolence exhibited by our ruling party is certainly unmatched.

Last week, the PPP-led cabinet decided to reinstate employees recruited in government departments from November 1993 to 1996, and then removed by the successor Nawaz Sharif government, with seniority and backdated financial benefits. A ministerial committee headed by Senator Raza Rabbani has been formed to evaluate the financial consequences of the decision. However, while announcing the decision, Information Minister Sherry Rehman resolutely declared that the reinstatement decision would be implemented, notwithstanding its dire financial implications.

Does the PPP not understand that citizens’ struggle for the return of democracy was not fuelled by a craving and withdrawal for the rancorous and alienating petty politics of the 1990s? In voting for change in the elections of 2008, the people of Pakistan had also chosen hope over experience. But in preferring discredited politicians of the 1990s to the pigmies propped up by a military regime, people hoped that the politicos would have learnt from history and would simply not return with a renewed urge to copy and replay it. By returning to splurge public power and state resources with an undue haste – as if struggling to make up for lost time – the PPP-led government has put a damper on the hopes and aspirations of citizens.

Is there a way to rationalise the misplaced zeal to return loyalists recruited by the last PPP government in 1996-97 after over a decade, and that too with backdated seniority and benefits? Is it just and fair to treat such PPP jiyalas who have been doing their own thing for almost 12 years at par with public officials and employees who have continued to serve this entire period in the ill-fated departments upon which the jiyalas will now be foisted again? Would the backdated benefits also include accumulated salaries for a decade of doing nothing? Under what retributive theory of law or equity can such plunder of state resources be justified, especially in the midst of a financial crisis where to-default-or-not-to default is the looming question?

Let us take the example of the Intelligence Bureau, for instance. In 1996, the PPP government created hundreds of new posts in the premier civilian intelligence agency and had no qualms about filling them up with ineligible and incompetent individuals. Being a jiyala or a relative of one was the sole criterion for induction. But while they were still on probation the PML-N government was sworn in, which immediately cleansed the IB of all probationary jiyalas. Most of them appealed their termination before the Federal Services Tribunal.

The FST found that “the appointments were made not on the basis of merit but on the recommendations of the ministers and other government functionaries,” and upheld the termination orders, as the employees had been dismissed during probation. The FST ruling was then appealed before the Supreme Court, which also dismissed the petitions, reiterating the well-settled legal principle that “a probationer has no vested right to continue in service.” So why can the PPP-led government not bury the hatchet and look to the future?

First of all, such reinstatements would be illegal. The highest court of the land had decided conclusively in 2000 that the probationers were legitimately laid-off. Thus, neither the cabinet nor any other executive office has the authority to reinstate such individuals, and with backdated seniority and benefits. They can be appointed afresh, but not reinstated. However, this issue once gain highlights the contradiction and malice of the Naek-formula contrived to return deposed judges to the courts. On the one hand, it insists that judges cannot be reinstated but only reappointed, and on the other it confers backdated seniority utterly devoid of constitutional mandate. If impermissibly removed judges can only be “reappointed,” how can legally removed executive minions be “reinstated”?

The issue of backdated seniority is more complicated, though. One, notwithstanding the PPP government’s lack of legal authority to confer seniority on judges through executive order, the act and its acceptance by the returning judges has established a precedent. If the government can determine the seniority of judges through executive order, why can it not do so with regard to employees falling under the executive branch of government? And, two, which court in this land will now have the courage (or the moral authority) to dissuade the PPP from thronging state agencies and public bodies with jiyalas endowed with fake seniority and ill-deserved benefits?

Apart from the little problem of illegality, and the fact that the cabinet’s resolve to grant cover to the PPP’s nepotistic urges will not make the scheme kosher, the PPP should refrain from this misadventure in view of its terrible consequences. Consider the new depths of incompetence and mediocrity to which the PPP reinstatement policy will drag the already dysfunctional state agencies. How would thousands of reinstated employees, with fake seniority and no developed skill-set, affect the morale of those presently serving in these agencies? How many legal challenges will the existing employees of such agencies mount to claim their seniority and right to promotion?

Will merit in this country continue to be slaughtered by partisan loyalties and base cronyism? Must employment generation always amount to sacrificing the viability of state agencies and public-sector organisations by indiscriminately adding party loyalists onto state payroll? Have we learnt no lessons from our flagship carrier and national railways that have been transformed into bloated deficit-making monstrosities? Why can the PPP not focus on revitalising the economy and the private sector as engines for job creation? And to the extent that the public sector needs more hands and minds, why are all energies focused on contriving schemes to bypass transparent merit-based hiring under the supervision of the Federal Public Services Commission?

True, Pakistan’s largest political party has been out of power – and its supporters out of favour – for over a decade. But it must get back in touch with reality and realise that gluttony and piggishness are neither popular nor sustainable forms of governance. A majority of Pakistan’s electorate voted for change on Feb 18. The prevailing despondency in the country is a reflection of their sense of being short-changed. The Zardari-led PPP has the opportunity to shepherd this nation at a time when it is desperately vying for a new direction. But for that to happen, it must break from its past, resist the temptation to pursue invidious schemes designed to reward its core supporters and garner momentary popularity, and start functioning as a government for all of Pakistan’s citizens.

A president Proving all too true to himself

Those counting on Asif Ali Zardari’s reinvention, that as president he would cast off the baggage of the past and be a new man, can be reminded of a line from Dostoyevsky that the second half of a man’s life is but a continuation of the first half.

Prince Siddhartha may have wandered off into the woods and attained enlightenment but that came after years of trial and renunciation. Here we have no Siddhartha, only someone catapulted to high position because of a quirk of fate, a tragedy visited upon his wife. Someone, moreover, whose principal claim to fame, apart from his marriage to Benazir Bhutto, was his apparently unbounded zest for surpassing wealth.

And there is no forest promising enlightenment, only a mess over which this Pakistani version of Croesus presides, a mess whose alarming proportions under his stewardship acquire a darker shade by the day.

It is easy to say that here’s a man who is clearly out of his depth. But it would be a futile exercise to blame him because since his sudden and largely unforeseen rise to power — first as PPP leader, then as president of the Republic — he has done nothing out of character. He has been himself and has done and said what comes naturally to him.

He is accused of cronyism and nepotism. But in the twilight world he inhabited before his wife’s assassination thrust him into the spotlight, these would be counted as virtues, not failings. The chattering classes or the newspaper-reading public — most of the time one and the same thing — may wax indignant about the installing of half-dead horses to high positions but in the president’s code of honour this again would count as a virtue: rewarding and therefore being faithful to those who stood by him in adversity.

Zardari has been criticised, and rightly so, for taking two planeloads of hangers-on to Saudi Arabia even if at his own expense. Presidents don’t do such things and if the splurge is from their own pockets, questions will be asked as to how those pockets are so deep. But we can almost be certain that in Zardari’s dictionary this counted as a good deed, a good turn to his friends and hangers-on, with the question of any criticism not arising because he was footing the bill himself.

It is a bit worrying to think that there was no one around him to tell him that he was wrong. Which should give us a peep into the kind of advice on which the country is being run, if the present drift and slide can be compared to running anything.

In Shakespeare’s Henry Fourth (Parts 1 and 2) Prince Hal, the king’s son, is a libertine, keeping company with Falstaff — the sublimest rogue in all literature — and his gang. They carouse together and even commit robberies together. But on the death of his father, Prince Hal, now Henry the Fifth, undergoes a transformation. Assuming the responsibilities of kingship he renounces his old ways and admonishes Falstaff to keep away from him. Falstaff was expecting rewards and high favours. He becomes a deeply disappointed man.

Pakistan expected a miracle when Zardari became president. But he has been faithful to himself, and has been what he always was, proving the sad truth that it is not given to everyone to undergo a Henry Fifth transformation. The old companions are back with none of Falstaff’s wit and vivaciousness. Falstaff’s vices were of the kind Ghalib and Hafiz and Khayyam would have approved of. Acquisitiveness did not figure amongst them. But if the spirit prevailing in Islamabad today can be summed up in a single word it is acquisitiveness. But is there any reason to be surprised? Wasn’t this precisely what was feared when Zardari’s rise to the top was imminent?

Why is there such a growing outcry against the proposed sale of the Qadirpur gas field in Sindh, probably the last bit of profit-making enterprise still left in public hands? Apart from other arguments whether this sale is in the country’s interest or not, the lurking suspicion in people’s minds is that all is not well with this proposed deal, that it is being made less for anything else than for lining the pockets of a favoured few.

Government credibility under Pervez Musharraf and Shaukat Aziz had plunged to an all-time low. People had stopped believing what they were told. Barely two months into the Zardari dispensation the impossible has happened. Official credibility which couldn’t have gotten worse stands further devalued.

Take the action against the country’s biggest forex dealers. The government could have every legitimate reason to go after them but, given government credibility, there is no shortage of people ready to believe the worst, even if it sounds far-fetched, that this action was taken because the dealers in question, earning huge profits from the flight of foreign currency, did not appease the right hands. This could be an extreme case of paranoia but that it should exist says something about the prevailing mood.

Exception was taken at the time to the remarks Zardari made when he met Sarah Palin in New York, in that they were considered less than presidential. What he said to President Bush, commending him for helping bring about democracy in Pakistan, also seemed to have an unseemly taste to them. But then what were we expecting? When Zardari was elected president — and it bears remembering that he was elected — was anyone under the impression that he was about to surprise us by some hitherto undiscovered gift of elocution?

We have got what was on offer, there being no cheating or falsity involved in the transaction. Zardari never promised anyone that he was about to change. In fact, if pressed on the matter, he would very likely have insisted, and vehemently at that, that there was nothing to change. And that if there was any wrong impression about him it was the work of enemies and paid agents.

Indeed, far from inducing any humility or the need for introspection, Zardari’s ascent to the presidency was trumpeted by his inner circle as the final proof of his smartness. That by bagging the prize of the presidency he had outwitted all and sundry, from Musharraf to the Sharifs to everyone else.

No one has ever accused Asif Ali Zardari of not being smart. No fool could have married Benazir Bhutto and no fool could have manipulated the political scene as he has done since the February elections. But there is no shortage, never has been, of smart and clever operators in Pakistan. Musharraf was clever enough but where did that leave him eventually? Could anyone be smarter than Shaukat Aziz but what’s the general opinion about him now?

It is not clever people that we lack. We have them in plenty, in every sphere of national life. Go to any bazaar, any patwari, any police station, any property agent’s office, and cleverness, or low cunning which cleverness all too often becomes, will be found stacked on the shelves, packed into every corner. It is wisdom, some measure of it, that Pakistan has been searching for these past sixty years and it is this elusive grail we are not finding.

If cleverness alone could be the solution to our national predicament we would have been out of the woods long ago and well on the way to the promised land. But that we are still wandering about in circles, still groping for a sense of direction, shows that it is something more we need.

If Zardari was on his own and had only himself to look out for all would be well. But our tragedy and perhaps his too is that, for better or worse, his fate and the nation’s are, for the present at least, intertwined. His presidency prospers and we swim. But if he makes a hash of things, as his actions or his lack of understanding about the basics of government suggest that he may well do, he may not take the pillars of the temple down with him — for that would be to exaggerate matters — but he undermines the entire post-Feb 18 dispensation.

What that might mean, what it might lead to, is not entirely foreseeable at the moment.

Concept of National Security

In his Politics among Nations, Hans Morgenthau defined national security as “the integrity of the national territory and its institutions.” Till recently, national security meant a state’s freedom from another state. This definition envisages national security problems arising with countries that are close and/or powerful enough for their actions to threaten the security of the given state.

Globalisation has made national borders irrelevant and brought about radical changes in the concept of national security. Traditionally the military has been at the heart of security policy; now national security must be evaluated more in terms of human, economic and cultural terms than in the securing of territorial space by the military.

National security involves protecting the nation’s infrastructure, the potency of its foreign policy and economy, the civil rights of its citizens, trade and work availability and the essentials of national sovereignty. National Security envisages the interrelationship of these facts with terrorism, globalisation, poverty and human trafficking and/or illegal immigration. Three factors in the 21st century predominate national security: the economy, the demographic movement of people and the threats and attacks by extremists.

National security is divided into state security and societal security, the former based on territorial security, the latter centred on identity. Weakening of territorial security, due to the influences of globalisation, has left identities far more exposed and threatened. Being a declared ally of the US in the war against terror, Pakistan has been exposed to several outside influences, which include economic, social, cultural, political and military factors.

Our rulers have ignored societal security. Whenever religious, sectarian, political, ethnic or cultural identities of people are threatened by the state, people react by fighting back. The loss of East Pakistan in 1971 is a glaring example. To an extent this also holds true in Balochistan, while the situation in Waziristan is more ideological, with people fighting for their rights to protect their identities and socio-economic and political rights.

Components of national security include: (1) domestic and foreign interest, goals and objectives vital to Pakistan’s national security; (2) foreign policy commitments and the defence entity necessary to deter aggression and to implement the country’s security objectives by political, economic, military and other elements of national power; and (3) the potential and capability to carry out the national security strategy and support its implementation.

National Security goals require (1) consensus through the freely declared will of the units of the federation (2) allocation of resources in a way that creates instruments to provide for the state’s defence and furtherance of its goals; (3) long-range planning in a substantive and systematic manner, with the participation of elected representatives providing the political dynamics; (4) strategy formulation encompass crises management as well as near-term policy planning and implementation activity; (5) development of a common vision and purpose for the near-term future; (6) comprehensive effort for the making of a coherent economic policy: too often we depend upon crisis management rather than long-term strategy formulation; (7) a coherent strategy to deal with transnational issues such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, money-laundering and environmental security; and (8) end to the tendency of exclusive reliance on institutions and processes, because it is really people who define the character of institutions and make the processes what they are.

The following main objectives relate to both internal and external security: (1) enhancement of our security; (2) promotion of prosperity at home; and (3) promotion of democracy.

The main objectives can be further broken up as follows: (1) maintenance of the integrity and security of Pakistan; (2) securing the safety of its strategic assets; (3) rehabilitation of the economy and restoring investor confidence; (4) dealing firmly with militancy and religious extremism; (5) avoidance of any damage to the Kashmir cause; (6) strengthening of the federation, removal of inter-provincial disharmony and restoration of national cohesion; (7) ensuring of law and order and dispensing of speedy justice; (8) de-politicising of state institutions; (9) devolution of power to the grassroots level; (10) ensuring swift and across-the- board accountability; (11) declaring a war against drugs and illegal immigration; (12) taking pragmatic steps to eradicate/minimise poverty; (13) eradicate corruption by carrying out fair and comprehensive accountability; (14) curtail the proliferation of weapons; (15) creating a national Identity competing with the ethnic ones.

We must improve the quality of our middle and higher echelons of leadership to provide dividends. While large segments of our society will remain poor, deprived and marginally trained, the talented and the selected few must get access to quality education. It is around this core that we must build a modern state. The South Indian software miracle was not an isolated phenomenon, but part of the Indian thrust to create a class of excellence.

We have already seen states more powerful than Pakistan crumble under the weight of declining economics, alienation of people and soaring military expenditure. Security policy must be developed that is guided by national needs based on socio-economic justice and adherence to rule of law. Otherwise, not only will our national security be in jeopardy but the country’s very survival will be at stake.

The dying of the light

“Rage, rage against the dying of the light,” Welsh poet Dylan Thomas had famously urged in one of his finest works. The people of Pakistan have raged for years, battling adversity of all kinds, but now, despite their brave fight, the light of hope does truly seem to be dying.

This has seemed particularly apparent when contrasted against recent events in the USA. Barack Obama’s historic entry to the White House, watched by thousands around the world, has inspired immense excitement, bringing to a society combating adversity on several counts a genuine ray of hope. Whether or not Obama succeeds in tackling the massive economic issues his nation confronts and the threat of mass unemployment it brings with it, moments of genuine optimism, such as those brought about by his triumph against all kinds of odds, are what any society needs. His own story too, a tale of a fairytale rise from out of the depths of poverty and deprivation into the highest office of the land, is too inspirational. As the election showed, it has drawn many of America’s most dispossessed and marginalized citizens into the mainstream of politics.

Sadly, such a sequence of events still seems unthinkable in the Pakistan of today. Politicians come only from the ranks of the rich; college- and university- level education too seems almost solely the preserve of the more privileged. The access to opportunity that enabled a small, poor boy named Barack Obama to overcome the disadvantages posed by the colour of his skin and the circumstances of his birth to reach the spot he holds today is simply not available. This is in itself a source of despondency for many. The possibilities that should be offered by education and a system of merit, to climb out of poverty simply do not exist. For many who are born in poverty, the realization that they will die too in almost similar circumstances, come early in life. This lack of mobility in more ways than one cripples and bogs down the nation, while preventing the emergence of talent.

But there is more even than this behind the stifling cover of darkness that seems to have descended over the country. Few people seem able, any longer, to see the light. Rather than a tunnel, they seem now to be trapped in a labyrinth from which there is no exit. Whether or not it is rooted in reality, the perception is that the government of the day is not committed to change of any kind. And of course, it is change, preferably dramatic in nature that people today yearn for. So far, there has been almost no semblance of any policy that can bring this about. The continued deadlock over the issue of judicial restoration is too a source of disappointment, given the symbolic value the tussle had assumed. In other areas too, little seems to be happening. There seems to have been no meaningful thought on education – the sector that is perhaps most crucial to change. The ministerial portfolio for this crucial sphere of life has been handed over to a feudal overlord from Sindh who has in the past been involved in a ‘jirga’ decision calling for the handing over of five small girls to settle a tribal dispute. Obviously, an individual capable of such an act can hardly be expected to favour education and the enlightenment that should come with it. Other cabinet appointments, including that of the infamous Israrullah Zehri from Balochistan, offer little inspiration either. They have acted also as a divisive factor, with civil society obviously angered by the grossly ill-thought-out moves, and as such support for the government has rapidly slipped even further.

The loss of hope we see everywhere around us is an extremely serious phenomenon. It indeed unites people from all kinds of backgrounds, with the wealthy, the middle class and the poor all apparently suffering from a similar despair. The only difference is that the rich and the relatively rich can in many cases escape, leaving for other, safer shores. Businesses involved in assisting immigration report a massive rise in the number of people seeking to go overseas over the past few months. The brain-drain has been enormous. The more impoverished too make their attempts to make a get away from lives that offer only misery. Some who climb aboard the illegal ships engaged in human smuggling or attempt to cross borders without papers using other means succeed. Others, from Sargodha, from Gujranwala, from Mardan, from Hyderabad and from elsewhere do not make it. It is their stories we occasionally read about in single-column items in the press, which describe how they died of suffocation in packed trucks, were shot dead at an international frontier or ended up in countries such as Burkina Faso where they had been dumped by traffickers.

In the situation we face today, it is unrealistic to expect any government – unless it comes miraculously equipped with a giant-sized bottle of some magic potion – to do very much in a short period of time. But what is important is that the government demonstrate a desire and a readiness to make a difference. There is, as yet, no indication of this. We do not see any sign of ardent planning; unlike Obama who has already brought key economic experts aboard on to his team and laid out, in outline, his plan to come to the aid of the middle classes, the effort to bring in experts to key slots is still limited. There has indeed been little effort to tap talent. The latest cabinet inflation represents, quite clearly, political expediency – and nothing more. Any thought of actually delivering to people is obviously secondary or does not exist at all.

It is striking that across the country people seem to be looking into the future with a growing sense of trepidation, indeed even fear. People speak of scenarios that include a full-fledged US invasion or even of a change in geographical boundaries across the region. Such comment, even when it comes casually, would have been considered almost unacceptable even ten years ago. The mood that prevails among people is not one that should be ignored. Already, the sense of inaction and of chaos is triggering rumours of all kinds. These will obviously damage the government further. Those within its ranks, who possess integrity and acumen, need to speak out now within their party. They must attempt to make a difference; they must prevent the light from dying entirely out – for once this happens, it may be almost impossible to flick it back on again.

No arbitrage in Governance

THE local bodies system is likely to undergo fundamental changes, if not a complete reversal, in Punjab, the Frontier, Balochistan and also perhaps Sindh once the provinces are allowed, as apparently has been decided, to chart their own course. Why is the system unravelling?

The devolution plan, the biggest plank of Musharraf’s zealous reform agenda, was built on the commonsensical rationale that a government should be close to its people. It garnered substantial support — grants, loans, technical assistance and praise — from donors and civil society. But it suffered from several design, scope and execution flaws. It was also opposed by a leading section of the civil service.

But these factors, though important will not cause its permanent disfigurement or demise. It is likely to fall apart because it is a victim of impatience — the common technocratic disdain for the political process. Aiming to reconstruct the nation within a few years, the architects of the local bodies system ignored obvious roadblocks in the political economy. In the absence of legitimate political support, i.e. legislation by free, sovereign provincial assemblies which have a constitutional prerogative on matters of local government, it was never going to last.

The absence of the democratic process isn’t a question of abstract constitutional niceties. Free (or even freer) assemblies and legislators were never going to passively accept a drastic emasculation of their powers to allocate resources and make personnel decisions in the key areas of health, education, water and sanitation, agriculture, and small-scale infrastructure development. Especially since the commensurate transfer of powers from the federal to the provincial tier, promised at the time (inadequate anyway for patronage purposes at the grass roots) did not materialise.

The powers of the district nazims with large manpower and financial resources at their disposal overshadowed those of the legislators. District and tehsil nazims became extremely powerful. Many MNAs and MPAs resigned from the assemblies to contest and win elections to the office of the nazim. Those who couldn’t or whose families didn’t partake of the devolution power bounty were very unhappy. Battle lines over who could claim credit for the construction of a local road or a peon transfer were quickly drawn.

The NRB admonished that the international experience dictated that provincial legislators should not get involved in issues of local development and law and order and should concentrate on legislation. However, legislators incessantly pushed by their constituents for local favours calmly and expectedly ignored this patronising advice.

The provincial governments’ opposition to devolution was not just about matters of ego. With most functions transferred to the district set-up, chief ministers didn’t have a large enough area to implement their agendas or claim any credit. With service delivery the prerogative of the non-party nazims, there wasn’t much left for the chief ministers (and political parties) to fight provincial elections on.

Faced with such gritty (and much-predicted opposition), Musharraf pushed for the protection of the Local Government Ordinance (LGO) in the 17th Amendment which was approved by a pliant parliament in 2003. As a result of the constitutional amendment the provinces were barred from amending the LGO without the president’s approval until 2009. As long as Musharraf was in power, his pet project would be safe.

Still resistance from the provincial governments was relentless and even Musharraf couldn’t withstand the pressure from the chief ministers. Several amendments in the LGO were introduced to increase the powers of the chief ministers vis-à-vis the nazims. The chief ministers also used administrative measures to enhance their powers. In Punjab, a ban on all transfers and postings without the explicit permission of the chief minister was enforced. In NWFP, the chief minister reduced the development allocations to the districts to assert his supremacy over recalcitrant nazims.

Without Musharraf tilting the balance in their favour, district governments were never going to win the war with provincial governments — donors and NGOs and dozens of support programmes notwithstanding. Had nazims used their substantial powers to advance the interest of the common man, thus creating a greater stake of the citizen in the reform process, the rollback would have been more difficult. Unfortunately, the nazims didn’t. The impact of the devolution plan on service delivery, even according to its most ardent admirers, was at best modest.

Should politics dictate the final outcome of this apparently decent idea of local government? As long as the political process is legitimate, as is the case now, it should. According to the MQM, the only major political supporter of this idea, it should be retained. According to the PML-N in the Punjab and the ANP in the Frontier, it should be abolished. The PPP appears to support the system in the Punjab, giving tacit support to the nazims who are possible allies against the PML-N. In Sindh, the PPP legislators appear to be opposed to the devolution plan. The top PPP leadership is ambivalent.

Whatever the outcome, the negotiated process shall duly accommodate all power interests. These compromises may appear ugly and slow to the naive and the impatient, as it did to the devolution planners, but they mean an increased likelihood of sustainability.

In one NRB-organised India-Pakistan symposium on the subject in Lahore in the summer of 2007, NRB speakers claimed that devolution was a veritable revolution. Indian speakers, especially from civil society, on the other hand were critical of the slow progress of local governments in India. A constitutional amendment was introduced to promote local government during Rajiv Gandhi’s days but it was left to the states to introduce legislation they deemed suitable. Some states introduced substantial reforms. Most didn’t, with opposition rooted in the same turf war between local and provincial governments. The Indian union minister for panchayati raj was more philosophical; it would take some 20 to 30 years for the proper deepening of local governments, he hoped — without any sigh of impatience.

In short, in July 2007, India had a four-foot-tall shisham and we had a 60-foot-tall sufaida. In 2009, India shall have a 6-foot shisham and we are likely to have a hole in the ground.

Impatient citizens should learn a lesson (if they have not already done so after the regret of supporting the Musharraf coup). Technical governance interventions, however well-intended or well-designed, aren’t going to make a big difference. Like democracy, the most vital of all governance innovations, major reforms of government, are mostly about process, prudence and perseverance. In governance, like in shisham-growing, there are no opportunities for arbitrage. Devolution or no devolution.

Separatist Billboards

There is little question that an American-occupied Afghanistan has emerged as the biggest security threat to Pakistan. But you wouldn’t know it watching the Pakistani ruling elite, busy in creating the world’s most bloated government. The CIA is attacking Pakistani territory with impunity. Afghanistan, in effect an American base, is the main source of inspiration, funding and weapons to terrorists spreading chaos in both NWFP and Balochistan.

And now we have 40-feet wide billboards that have mysteriously sprung up on the main roads of NWFP showing the map of a new country – Pashtunistan – with meticulously defined borders that incorporate most of northwestern Pakistan. This ‘billboard campaign’ has to be the boldest statement of rebellion and separatism ever made in the history of nation-states anywhere in the world. Yet it’s business as usual in Islamabad.

Security analysts have been warning since 2007 that Pakistan is committing a blunder by allowing Pakistani politicians to conduct their separate foreign policies with foreign countries, especially America whose massive agenda of redrawing the map of the region is a direct threat to Pakistani interests. America and Britain in particular have a history of orchestrating coups and covertly funding chaos and insurgencies and changing governments in our part of the world. In this context, it is disturbing to see how our political and military leaderships have allowed Washington, its diplomats and its spymasters to directly access political parties, invite them on secret, all-expenses-paid trips to Washington and have direct say in Pakistani affairs. The American intervention, starting late 2006 and early 2007, effectively managed to bring a regime change in Islamabad, thanks partially to the blunders of the previous regime. There is no free lunch and the Americans have specific expectations from the new rulers in Pakistan: The permission for increased American military operations inside Pakistan, meeting the American desire for clipping Pakistan’s intelligence capabilities, and changing the military’s orientation from a standing army into some kind of a police force focused on fighting insurgencies.

The deliberate destabilization of Pakistan will result in turning large parts of the country against the federal government and increasingly draw the military into a civil war that will bleed us for decades to come in the presence of covert support from Afghan soil. The result would be a weakened Pakistani state unable to sustain control over its territory and over its vast arsenal of nuclear and strategic assets. The Americans are also keen that Pakistan gets entangled again in the IMF cobweb, which basically means one more American control over Pakistan. Interestingly, the only thing that appears to be stopping the current government from cowing to American diktat is domestic political reaction. Apart from the IMF option, we are yet to see any real moves to deal with the economic crisis.

It is time for Pakistani commentators and civil society activists to realize that their idealism has resulted in encouraging the people to vote for the same tried, tested and failed politicians who cannot deliver. Our civil society activists need to stop viewing every call to reform our democracy and political system with an eye of suspicion. What would it take for our liberals and commentators to understand that even good ideas, like local governments, don’t work under our paralyzed political system? It is time to reorient the Pakistani state and government structure.

Special interest groups cannot be allowed to have permanent monopoly over our politics. Political parties need to be forcibly democratized to allow the ascent of Pakistan’s middle class in politics. Ethnic politics, the new Trojan horse of anyone who wants to meddle in our affairs, have to be ended through legislation and by creating more provinces on administrative lines and by strengthening Pakistani nationalism. The question is: Who will do this? The current crop of politicians can’t. The military is not trained to do this, at least not alone. I am afraid we are soon approaching a situation where something will have to be thought of outside the box.

It’s either this or more separatist billboards in the future.

Government, army and Politics

In Pakistan victorious politicians have acquired substantive, even if not total, state and government power and they enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The Establishment too has moved on the “back foot.” There has been a marked improvement in Pakistan’s civil military relations since the new government came into power. There is regular interaction between the two leaderships and at present there is near-consensus on national security issues, especially on a national strategy for combating terrorism. For example, the army also supported the Oct 22 resolution which called for “an urgent review of the national security strategy and revisiting the methodology of combating terrorism in order to restore peace and stability through an independent foreign policy. The Pakistan military today is focusing on its constitutional role and staying away from the political arena. The civilian government has managed key first including the presentation of the defense budget in the parliament, the briefing by the director general military operation on the tribal areas to the joint session of the Parliament; the consensus appointment of the ISI chief, regular briefings on the tribal areas to the civilian leadership.

The Army’s current constitutional posture may be due to the army chief’s personal democratic temperament, but there are also objective conditions that have led to the military exit from overt and covert involvement in politics. These would include the extreme nationwide unpopularity and resentment against Gen Musharraf’s eight-year rule, the military’s low morale because of having to fight its own people, high casualties since the beginning of the 2004 military action in the tribal areas, the growing public resentment against the army involvement in politics and stories of its corruption. It is against this backdrop that the current military leadership has remained steadfast in its resolve to steer clear of politics. Beginning with the February elections the Army has delinked itself from politics and has kept its prime intelligence agencies, the ISI and MI, away from all political manipulation.

Meanwhile, with the government’s authority and legitimacy comes a huge canvas of demands on the internal front that the government must fulfil. They range from politics to economy and from communication to managing rising expectations. Of these multiple challenges eight are noteworthy:

Governance and economy: typically under the ambit of governance would fall issues like provision of social services, dispensation of justice, ruling by meritocracy, beating down inflation; leading by example; creation of an environment conducive to profitable economic activity which would generate jobs; similarly, policy implementation, the efficient utilisation of resources, tackling the current energy crises and controlling inflation and ensuring food security. Hence, the democratically elected government must now provide all that which would owner the classic social contract between the state and society.

Managing rising awareness and expectations: a combination of factors ranging from the information revolution, media-facilitated awareness among citizen of their constitutional rights and of the ruing elite responsibilities have popularised the demand for accountable exercise of power and authority. People expectation and demand rule of law, transparent government: a government that is receptive and responsive to peoples, needs and demands, and that allows the functioning of an independent judiciary and an independent press.

Flawless leadership: people and the nature of the challenges require almost flawless leadership. Pakistan’s leadership needs to “lead from the front” in establishing new ways of tolerance, discipline, patience and above all making competence and integrity the indispensables for key appointments. It is only when political and partisan considerations become paramount that democratic chaos can devour the virtues of democracy. In Pakistan, where for decades we have blundered along the path of democracies and dictatorship, people are seeking the strengthening of democracy’s virtues. The citizens feel more empowered while the government must ability manage the rising expectation of the 160 million people of whom 100 million are below the age of 25.

Participation and inclusion: a corollary of managing people’s expectation is to encourage their participation and inclusion in the process of policy formulation, policy implementation, policy debate in all circumstances. The need for this is particularly acute in an adverse socio economic, security and to some extend political environment in which the citizens suffer greatly. Ensuring people’s participation and inclusion in difficult times as now prevail in the country, contributes to lowering tensions between the government and the citizens gives the citizens a sense of ownership of process. Plus, it reduces alienation and confrontation between a democratically elected government and the citizen living under hardships. The avenues for such participation and inclusion would be a representative parliament body, interaction between opinion making community and the policymaker, forums provided by the media.

Constitutional amendments: as a consequence of the 17th Amendment passed under Gen Pervez Musharraf the Constitution was radically altered. Essentially the parliamentary form of government was changed to the presidential form of government. The Charter of Democracy signed by two major national political leaders, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, has laid out the constitutional amendment needed to remove the anomalies introduce under the 17th Amendment. In his first address to the country’s joined Parliament President Asif Ali Zardari announced that he would shortly set up a parliamentary committee to recommend constitutional changes. The committee has yet to be formed.

Strengthening of institutions: the process of institutional reforms initiated during Gen Musharraf’s regime, especially in the financial sector including the State Bank, the CBR and the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, needs to be spread wider. The long overdue Election Commission reform, civil services reform, public sector training Institutional reform, needs to be undertaken without efficiently and credibly functioning federal provincial and district level bureaucracy the crises of governance cannot be effectively tackled.

More efficient and effective regulatory bodies in various sectors are also required. Ultimately, without strong institutions personalised decision-making cannot be replaced with what Pakistan needs-institutionalised decision-making.

Acute crises of internal security: however, in recent weeks important developments indicate that a consensus on how to deal with the internal and external dimension of terrorism is evolving. The passage of the Oct 22 joint 14-point consensus resolution by the two houses of Parliament calling for an end to military operation and the beginning of dialogue with the tribal elders and those militant who are willing to lay down their arms and calling for an end to US attack on Pakistani territory is significant.

There has been support for an ongoing dialogue with Kabul and the convening of the Pakistani-Afghan mini-jirga. Also there is greater civil military coordination at the leadership and institutional level. A parliamentary committee has now been formed for implementing the Oct 22 resolution while the government continuously calls for an end to drone attacks killing innocent civilians. US attacks are unlikely to end unless Islamabad and Washington are able to engage in a comprehensive and serious dialogue on tackling terrorism.

Specific issues: issues ranging from Balochistan, the Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) tos water distribution will require continuous systematic and credible effort to politically resolve the chronic problem of alienation among the Baloch. The president’s apology to the people of Balochistan for the killing of Sardar Bugti, the military operation the denial of right to their resources have all been positive steps. Engaging Dubai-based Baloch nationalists is also a welcome step. More systematic follow-up is still awaited.

The ball is now squarely in the court of Zardari and Gilani. They shoulder the primary, if not exclusive responsibility to take the country forward on the track of good governance, political stability and sound security.